Foresight as a survival characteristic: when (if ever) does the long view pay?
Author: Ayres, Robert U. ; Axtell, R.INSEAD Area: Economics and Political Science Series: Working Paper ; 93/83/EPS Publisher: Fontainebleau : INSEAD, 1993.Language: EnglishDescription: 13 p.Type of document: INSEAD Working Paper Online Access: Click here Abstract: Long range RandD and capital investment projects are normally evaluated by means of a procedure (benefit/cost analysis) that involves a choice of time preference functions. Benefit-cost analysts and many economist typically assume that time preference is a behavioral fact of life, and that the time preference function is essentially equivalent to a compound interest law. in practice, they tend to choose discount rates in the range of 3%-8% p.a. in real terms. Variability in projected benefit/cost ratios resulting from this uncertainty is commonly dealt with ad hoc, e.g. by simply presenting results for several different discount rates and letting the "decision-maker" select among them. It is argued in this paper that the basic discounting methodology is fundamentally flawed and can lead to significantly inferior social choices, i.e. choices that would be rejected by virtually any rational actor to whom the choice were fairly presented. A more general methodology is needed| Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds |
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Digital Library | Available | BC000974 |
Long range RandD and capital investment projects are normally evaluated by means of a procedure (benefit/cost analysis) that involves a choice of time preference functions. Benefit-cost analysts and many economist typically assume that time preference is a behavioral fact of life, and that the time preference function is essentially equivalent to a compound interest law. in practice, they tend to choose discount rates in the range of 3%-8% p.a. in real terms. Variability in projected benefit/cost ratios resulting from this uncertainty is commonly dealt with ad hoc, e.g. by simply presenting results for several different discount rates and letting the "decision-maker" select among them. It is argued in this paper that the basic discounting methodology is fundamentally flawed and can lead to significantly inferior social choices, i.e. choices that would be rejected by virtually any rational actor to whom the choice were fairly presented. A more general methodology is needed
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