Environmental regulation and innovation
Author: Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard ; Cadot, OlivierINSEAD Area: Technology and Operations Management Series: Working Paper ; 92/28/TM/EP Publisher: Fontainebleau : INSEAD, 1992.Language: EnglishDescription: 21 p.Type of document: INSEAD Working Paper Online Access: Click here Abstract: The paper considers a case in which the threat of environmental regulation can be used by a government to induce a domestic firm to engage in a socially desirable product-development effort. We use a stochastic game to show that even if the government is restricted to Markov strategies, a non-trivial, self-enforcing incentive scheme can be devised. More efficient outcomes can be implemented by equilibria using strategies that condition on the payoff-irrelevant history. An example of such an equilibrium is given.| Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds |
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Digital Library | Available | BC000926 |
The paper considers a case in which the threat of environmental regulation can be used by a government to induce a domestic firm to engage in a socially desirable product-development effort. We use a stochastic game to show that even if the government is restricted to Markov strategies, a non-trivial, self-enforcing incentive scheme can be devised. More efficient outcomes can be implemented by equilibria using strategies that condition on the payoff-irrelevant history. An example of such an equilibrium is given.
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