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Prudence and success in politics

Author: Cadot, Olivier ; Sinclair-Desgagné, BernardINSEAD Area: Economics and Political Science ; Technology and Operations Management Series: Working Paper ; 90/86/EPS/TM Publisher: Fontainebleau : INSEAD, 1990.Language: EnglishDescription: 30 p.Type of document: INSEAD Working Paper Online Access: Click here Abstract: This paper proposes a theory of political inertia. The setup is a repeated game between an infinitely-lived electorate and finitely-lived politicians. The latter are endowed with a given reputation for competence. In one equilibrium, politicians seeking re-election exhibit an extreme form of caution, avoiding any risky involvement. Other equilibria exist, however, in which moderately cautious politicians take up those challenges that are not too informative about their competence
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This paper proposes a theory of political inertia. The setup is a repeated game between an infinitely-lived electorate and finitely-lived politicians. The latter are endowed with a given reputation for competence. In one equilibrium, politicians seeking re-election exhibit an extreme form of caution, avoiding any risky involvement. Other equilibria exist, however, in which moderately cautious politicians take up those challenges that are not too informative about their competence

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