Unavoidable mechanisms
Author: Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard INSEAD Area: Technology and Operations Management Series: Working Paper ; 90/01/TM Publisher: Fontainebleau : INSEAD, 1990.Language: EnglishDescription: 41 p.Type of document: INSEAD Working Paper Online Access: Click here Abstract: This paper is an attempt to explain the frequent use of some allocation mechanisms, like the open English auctions and the sealed-bid discriminating auctions. Given a criterion for the allocation of resources, a mechanism is called unavoidable within a range of environments if it must be embedded in any allocation mechanism that does as well or better in these environments. When the criterion is the planner's payoff, classes of environments can be identified where the commonly observed auctions are unavoidable| Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds |
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Digital Library | Available | BC000821 |
This paper is an attempt to explain the frequent use of some allocation mechanisms, like the open English auctions and the sealed-bid discriminating auctions. Given a criterion for the allocation of resources, a mechanism is called unavoidable within a range of environments if it must be embedded in any allocation mechanism that does as well or better in these environments. When the criterion is the planner's payoff, classes of environments can be identified where the commonly observed auctions are unavoidable
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