Les Politiques environmentalistes et la structure interne de la firme
Author: Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard INSEAD Area: Economics and Political Science Series: Working Paper ; 93/56/EPS/SM Publisher: Fontainebleau : INSEAD Centre for the Management of Environmental and Social Responsibility (CMER) 1993.Language: FrenchDescription: 20 p.Type of document: INSEAD Working Paper Online Access: Click here Abstract: This article examines the influence of policies adopted by an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on the internal structure of the firm. The firm is seen as a two-level hierarchy. At the top, the CEO selects incentive mechanisms and decision procedures in order to maximize profits. At the bottom of the hierarchy, the employee makes use of the means at his disposal within the firm to maximize his own satisfaction. In case of an accident, the EPA can punish the firm, the employee, or both... Overall, the EPA's environmentalist policies support a centralized organization of the firmItem type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
![]() |
Digital Library | Available | BC000757 |
This article examines the influence of policies adopted by an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on the internal structure of the firm. The firm is seen as a two-level hierarchy. At the top, the CEO selects incentive mechanisms and decision procedures in order to maximize profits. At the bottom of the hierarchy, the employee makes use of the means at his disposal within the firm to maximize his own satisfaction. In case of an accident, the EPA can punish the firm, the employee, or both... Overall, the EPA's environmentalist policies support a centralized organization of the firm
Digitized
There are no comments for this item.