Supply chain logistics in an imperfect partnership: inventory management and incentive and information asymmetries
Author: Corbett, Charles J. INSEAD Area: Technology and Operations ManagementPublisher: Fontainebleau : INSEAD, 1996.Language: EnglishDescription: 130 p. ; 31 cm.Type of document: INSEAD ThesisThesis Note: For the degree of Ph.D. in management, INSEAD, June 1996Bibliography/Index: Includes bibliographical referencesAbstract: Most literature on supply chain logistics assumes one or two distinct types of buyer-supplier relationship: either an arm's-length one, or one based on partnership. This dissertation focuses on issues of supply chain coordination between a single buyer and a single supplier in the absence of a central planner. The setting we assume throughout could be called an "imperfect partnership". It can be briefly defined as follows: - buyer and supplier have a long-term agreement with each other - neither party is sufficiently powerful to impose its will on the other - neither party can assume the other will not behave opportunistically. The claim underlying this dissertation is that in such an "imperfect partnership" incentive and information asymmetries will inevitably occur, and that traditional operations management theory can be misleading or even incorrect when they are not given sufficient consideration List(s) this item appears in: Ph.D. Thesis| Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds |
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Asia Campus Archives |
INSEAD COR 1996
(Browse shelf) 900050216 |
Available | 900050216 | |||
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Europe Campus INSEAD Publications Display |
INSEAD COR 1996
(Browse shelf) 32419001033947 |
Available | 32419001033947 |
For the degree of Ph.D. in management, INSEAD, June 1996
Includes bibliographical references
Most literature on supply chain logistics assumes one or two distinct types of buyer-supplier relationship: either an arm's-length one, or one based on partnership. This dissertation focuses on issues of supply chain coordination between a single buyer and a single supplier in the absence of a central planner. The setting we assume throughout could be called an "imperfect partnership". It can be briefly defined as follows: - buyer and supplier have a long-term agreement with each other - neither party is sufficiently powerful to impose its will on the other - neither party can assume the other will not behave opportunistically. The claim underlying this dissertation is that in such an "imperfect partnership" incentive and information asymmetries will inevitably occur, and that traditional operations management theory can be misleading or even incorrect when they are not given sufficient consideration
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