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Economics and information systems

Author: Hendershott, T. Series: Handbooks in information systems ; 1 Publisher: Elsevier, 2006.Language: EnglishDescription: 666 p. : Graphs ; 25 cm.ISBN: 9780444517715ISSN: 15740145Type of document: BookBibliography/Index: Includes bibliographical references and index
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Book Europe Campus
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Print HB620 .E3 2006
(Browse shelf)
001274806
Available 001274806
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Includes bibliographical references and index

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Economics and Information Systems Table of contents Introduction CHAPTER 1 Diffusion of Information and Communication Technologies to Businesses C. Forman and A. Goldfarb 1. Introduction 2. ICT diffusion and its impact 2.1. Diffusion modeling 2.2. The impact of ICT diffusion xv 1 1 4 4 8 3. ICT adoption and organizational characteristics 3.1. Adoption, internal firm organization, and organizational change 3.2. Adoption and firm boundaries 3.3. Adoption and size 3.4. Technical infrastructure 3.5. Adoption, assimilation, intra-firm diffusion, and usage 9 9 14 17 18 19 4. Geographic differences in adoption 4.1. Adoption of ICT across urban and rural areas 4.2. Evidence of how ICT use influences location patterns 4.3. Future research 5.1. Co-invention 5.2. Strategic issues in technology adoption 21 23 24 24 5. Trade-offs between organization and environment 6. Network effects 25 26 28 30 32 33 6.1. Theoretical literature on direct and indirect network externalities 6.2. Evidence of network effects of any kind in ICT 6.3. Evidence of positive network externalities in ICT 7. Internet diffusion across countries 8. Conclusion Acknowledgments References 35 37 42 43 43 CHAPTER 2 Economics of Data Communications P. Afèche 1. Introduction 2. Problem definition and discussion framework 2.1. Service demand 2.2.. Service contracts: QoS guarantees and service designs 53 53 56 57 59 3. Pricing guaranteed services 2.3. 2.4. 2.5. 2.6. Service production Distinctive features in comparison to telephony Pricing decisions Discussion framework 73 73 75 78 78 80 81 63 67 67 71 4. Pricing best effort services 4.1. 4.2. 4.3. 4.4. 4.5. 4.6. 3.1. Features, modeling and overview 3.2. Basic pricing and allocation principles 3.3. Incomplete information and adaptive pricing 3.4. More differentiation 3.5. Optimal dynamic pricing 3.6. Conclusions and directions Features, modeling and overview Basic pricing and allocation principles Incomplete information and adaptive pricing More differentiation Optimal dynamic pricing Conclusions and directions 83 83 89 95 100 105 105 5. Pricing flexible bandwidth-sharing services 5.1. 5.2. 5.3. 5.4. 5.5. 5.6. Features, modeling and overview Basic pricing and allocation principles Incomplete information and adaptive pricing More differentiation Optimal dynamic pricing Conclusions and directions 106 106 109 1l1 115 115 117 118 124 126 6. Discussion 118 6.1. Auctions versus posted prices 6.2. Flat-rate versus usage-based pricing 6.3. Providing QoS: overprovisioning versus control 7. Conclusions 7.1. Research directions 7.2. Further topics and readings 128 128 129 References 129 CHAPTER 3 Firms and Networks in Two-Sided Markets D. F. Spulber 1. Introduction 2. Firms in two-sided markets 2.1. Firms in two-sided markets: matchmaking 2.2. Firms in two-sided markets: market making 2.3. Information systems and platforms 137 137 140 142 143 147 3. Networks in two-sided markets 3.1. Transactions on networks in two-sided markets 3.2. Basics of network theory 151 151 154 4. Assignments of buyers and sellers in a network: costly communication 156 4.1. Assignments with homogenous products 4.2. Assignments with differentiated products 4.3. Second-best assignments 157 161 165 5. Networks and the core in a two-sided market 6. Stable assignments in a decentralized two-sided market: costly computation 6.1. Stable assignments with homogenous products 6.2. Stable assignments with differentiated products 5.1. The core with homogenous products 5.2. The core with differentiated products 166 166 167 168 169 172 7. Firms and stable assignments in a centralized two-sided market 7.1. Firms and stable assignments with homogenous products 7.2. Firms and stable assignments with differentiated products 173 174 179 8. Matchmaking and market making by a firm using double auctions 8.1. Market making by a firm using double auctions for homogenous products 8.2. Matchmaking and market making by a firm using double auctions for differentiated products 181 182 183 9. Two-sided markets in random networks 9.1. Search and random assignments 9.2. Markets and random networks 188 188 193 10. Conclusion Acknowledgments References 196 197 197 CHAPTER 4 Organization Structure T. Marschak 201 1. Introduction 201 2. Goals, mechanisms, and informational costs: the "incentive-free" case, where individuals obey the designer's rules without inducement 204 2.1. Two general frameworks for judging the organization's actions 2.2. How the organization finds its current action when incentives are not an issue 2.3. Finite approximations of mechanisms whose message spaces are continua 2.4. The dynamics of a mechanism 2.5. Constructing an informationally efficient mechanism 2.6. Finding a best action rule (outcome function) o n c e a m e c h a n i s m h a s conveyed information about the environment to each the methods of the Theory of Teams 2.7. Designing an organization "from scratch": choosing its members, what each observes, and the speak-once-only mechanism that they use 204 207 230 233 236 person: 238 240 3. Models in which the designer is concerned with incentives as well as Informational costs 264 3.1. The message-space size required for implementation of a goal 265 3.2. Models in which the organization's mechanism is partly designed by its self-interested members, who bear some of the informational costs 3.3. Networks of self-interested decision-makers, who bear the network's informational costs 266 275 4. Organizational models in which the primitive is a "task", "problem", "project", or "item" 5. Concluding remarks References 278 280 281 CHAPTER 5 Open Source Software: The New Intellectual Property Paradigm S. M. Maurer and S. Scotchmer 285 1. Introduction 2. Incentives for RandD 2.1. Intellectual property and open source 2.2. Own use 2.3. Complementary goods and services 2.4. Signaling 2.5. Education 2.6. Achieving network externalities and denying them to others 2.7. Social psychology 285 287 288 290 290 293 295 295 296 3. Stability and organizational issues 3.1. Who contributes, and how much? 3.2. Who pays? 3.3. Why licenses? 3.4. Why leadership? 3.5. Network effects 4.1. Disclosure of code 4.2. Meeting users' needs 4.3. Deadweight loss and pricing 4.4. Training and using programmers 4.5. Free riding 4.6. Modularity and the organization of the research effort 300 300 301 302 304 305 4. Efficiency implications 306 306 307 308 308 310 310 5. Open source and proprietary software 5.1. Competition between open source and proprietary software 5.2. Market segmentation 312 312 314 6. Limitations and extensions 6.1. Limits to open source software 6.2. Beyond software: drug discovery, geographic information systems, and Wikipedia 315 315 315 7. Conclusion Acknowledgments References 318 319 319 CHAPTER 6 Information, Search, and Price Dispersion M. R. Baye, J. Morgan, and P. Scholten 1. Introduction 2. Theoretical models of price dispersion 2.1. Search-theoretic models of price dispersion 2.1.1. The Stigler model 2.1.2. The Rothschild critique and Diamond's paradox 2.1.3. The Reinganum model and optimal sequential search 2.1.4. Remarks on fixed versus sequential search 2.1.5. The MacMinn model 2.1.6. The Burdett and Judd model 2.2. Models with an "Information Clearinghouse2.2.1. The Rosenthal model 2.2.2. The Varian model 2.2.3. The Baye and Morgan model 2.2.4. Models with asymmetric consumers 2.5.5. Cost heterogeneities and the Spulber model 2.3. Bounded rationality models of price dispersion 2.4. Concluding remarks: theory 323 323 331 332 333 336 338 343 343 346 348 351 352 354 357 357 358 359 3. Empirical analysis of price dispersion 3.1. Measuring price dispersion 3.2. Price dispersion in the field 3.2.1. Dispersion and the "benefits" of search 3.2.2. Dispersion and the "cost" of search 3.2.3. Dispersion and the number of sellers 3.2.4. Dispersion and price persistence 3.3. Concluding remarks: empirics 360 360 363 363 365 367 369 370 Acknowledgments References 371 371 CHAPTER 7 Behavior-Based Price Discrimination and Customer Recognition D. Fudenberg and J. M. Villas-Boas 377 1. Introduction 2. Monopoly 2.1. Two-period model Base model No customer recognition Customer recognition and behavior-based price discrimination The role of commitment 2.2. Overlapping generations of consumers No constant prices in equilibrium Price cycles in equilibrium 2.3. Long-lived consumers 377 379 380 380 382 382 383 384 386 387 389 Long-term contracts Relationship to durable goods and bargaining 2.4. Two-good monopoly 391 393 396 3. Competition 3.1. Two periods, short-term contracts Analysis of the two-period model under the MHR assumption Discrete distributions Welfare 3.2. Infinite lived firms, overlapping generations of consumers, and short-term contracts 3.3. Long-term contracts 3.4. Switching costs 398 399 400 403 404 404 406 408 4. Behavior-based pricing with multiple products, and product design 4.1. Upgrades and buybacks with an anonymous second-handmarket 4.2. Upgrades and buybacks with non-anonymous consumers 4.3. Endogenous innovation 4.4. Endogenous location choice in duopoly 413 414 417 418 420 5. Related topics: privacy, credit markets, and customized pricing 5.1. Privacy 5.2. Credit markets 5.3. Customized pricing 422 422 426 429 6. Conclusion Acknowledgements References 431 433 433 CHAPTER 8 Information Technology and Switching Costs Pei-yu Chen and L. M. Hitt I. Introduction 2. Switching cost: definition and measurement issues 3. Switching costs, competition, and firm strategy 3.1. 3.2. 3.3. 3.4. Switching costs and competition Endogenous switching costs Switching costs in information-intensive markets Empirical evidence Switching costs in software and other "high-tech" markets Switching costs in online markets 437 438 440 444 444 444 445 448 449 450 4. Endogenous switching costs and firm strategy in information-intensive markets 5. A framework for managing switching costs 5.1. Introduction 5.2. A model of customer retention 5.3. Measuring switching costs 451 455 455 457 461 6. Conclusion Acknowledgments References 464 466 467 CHAPTER 9 The Economics of Privacy K.-L. Hui and I.P.L. Png 1. Introduction 2. "Free market" approach 3. Within-market consequential externalities 4. Cross-market consequential externalities 5. Direct externalities 6. Property rights 7. Regulation 8. Empirical evidence 9. Future directions Acknowledgment References 3.1. Non-productive information 3.2. Productive information 471 471 475 476 481 483 485 487 489 492 493 493 477 480 CHAPTER 10 Product Bundling X. Geng, M. B. Stinchcombe, and A. B. Whinston 1. Introduction 2. Bundling for price discrimination: the case of two products 2.1. The base model 2.2. Issues to be considered in monopoly bundling 2.2.1. Pure bundling, mixed bundling, and the combinatorial issue 2.2.2. Bundling products and bundling buyers 2.2.3. Monitoring purchase 2.2.4. Posted price and auction 2.3. Pure bundling 2.4. Mixed bundling 2.5. Extension: bundling complements or substitutes 3.1. The integer programming approach 3.2. Pure or simple mixed bundling of many products 4.1. A monopoly market plus a competitive market 4.2. A monopoly market plus a potentially duopoly market: the additive valuations case 4.3. A monopoly market plus a potentially duopoly market: the complements case 4.4. Duopoly bundling 499 499 502 503 503 504 504 504 505 505 508 510 512 513 517 517 519 520 3. Bundling for price discrimination: the case of many products 4. Bundling as competition tools 510 515 5. Concluding remarks Acknowledgment 522 523 CHAPTER 11 Dynamic Pricing in the Airline Industry R. P. McAfee and Vera L. to Velde 1. Airline pricing 2. Existing literature 3. Dynamic price discrimination with price commitment 4. Continuous time theory 5. Efficiency in the Gallego and van Ryzin model 6. Efficiently allocating limited capacity under uncertainty 7. The log normal case 8. Options and interruptible sales 9. Actual airline pricing patterns 10. Research projects and mysteries 11. Conclusion Appendix References 527 529 529 534 536 541 541 546 548 551 556 561 561 567 CHAPTER 12 Online Auctions A. Ockenfels, D. H. Reiley, and A. Sadrieh 571 1. Why do information systems make auctions (even) more popular? 571 2. Single-object auctions: theory and experiments 573 2.1. Standard auction mechanisms and models 2.2. Bidding behavior and auction outcomes in theory 2.3. Bidding behavior in controlled laboratory and field experiments 3.1. Theoretical considerations 3.2. Empirical and experimental observations 3.2.1. Entry and revenue effects of public and secret reserve prices 3.2.2. Auction fever 3.2.3. Shill bids 573 575 577 3. Reserve prices, minimum bids, and shill bids 582 584 587 587 590 591 4. Late and incremental bidding 5. The buy-now option 594 599 600 601 602 603 6. Parallel markets and other outside options 7. Multi-item auctions 5.1. Explaining the buy-now option with risk-aversion 5.2. Explaining the buy-now option with impatience and other transaction costs 5.3. Explaining the buy-now option with a sequence of transaction opportunities 5.4. Empirical and experimental evidence 605 608 608 610 612 7.1. Standard multi-unit auction mechanisms 7.2. Bid shading and demand reduction in multi-unit auctions 7.3. Complementarities and combinatorial auctions 8. Design of online auctions 8.1. The advantages of long, open auctions 8.2. Controlling the pace of bidding 8.3. Design aspects in multi-unit auctions 614 614 616 620 Acknowledgements References 621 622 CHAPTER 13 Reputation Mechanisms C. Dellarocas I. Introduction 2. Signaling and sanctioning role of reputation mechanisms 3. Reputation in game theory and economics 3.1. 3.2. 3.3. 3.4. 4.1. 4.2. 4.3. 4.4. 4.5. Basic concepts Reputation dynamics When is reputation bad? Other extensions to the basic theory Eliciting sufficient and honest feedback Exploring the design space of feedback mediators Coping with cheap online identities Understanding the consequences of strategic manipulation Distributed reputation mechanisms 629 629 633 635 635 638 640 642 4. New opportunities and challenges of online mechanisms 643 643 645 647 648 649 651 654 5. Empirical and experimental studies 651 655 657 5.1. Empirical studies and field experiments 5.2. Controlled experiments 6. Conclusions: opportunities for IS research References Subject Index 661

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