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Competition policy: theory and practice

Author: Motta, Massimo Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP) 2004.Language: EnglishDescription: 616 p. ; 24 cm.ISBN: 9780521016919Type of document: BookNote: Doriot: For 2018-2019 coursesBibliography/Index: Includes bibliographical references and index
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Book Europe Campus
Main Collection
Print HD41 .M68 2004
(Browse shelf)
001259629
Available 001259629
Total holds: 0

Doriot: For 2018-2019 courses

Includes bibliographical references and index

Digitized

Competition Policy Theory and Practice Contents List of Figures List of Tables Preface Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations 1 Competition Policy: History, Objectives, and the Law 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Brief History of Competition Policy 1.2.1 Anti-Trust Law in the United States 1.2.2 Competition Laws in the European Union 1.3 Objectives of Competition Policy and Other Public Policies 1.3.1 Objectives of Competition Policy 1.3.2 Other Public Policy Factors Affecting Competition 1.3.3 Competition Policy: A Definition 1.4 The Main Features of European Competition Law 1.4.1 Article 81: Horizontal and Vertical Agreements 1.4.2 Article 82: Abuse of a Dominant Position 1.4.3 Mergers 1.5 Exercises 2 Market Power and Welfare: Introduction 2.1 Overview of the Chapter 2.2 Allocative Efficiency 2.2.1 Market Power: A Definition 2.2.2 The Allocative Inefficiency of a Monopoly 2.2.3 Rent-Seeking Activities 2.3 Productive Efficiency 2.3.1 Additional Welfare Loss from Productive Inefficiency 2.3.2 Why Is a Monopolist Less Efficient? 2.3.3 Number of Firms and Welfare page xiii xv xvii xxi xxiii 1 1 1 1 9 17 17 26 30 30 31 34 36 38 39 39 40 40 41 44 45 46 46 51 2.3.4 Conclusions 2.3.5 Competition and Productive Efficiency* 2.4 Dynamic Efficiency 2.4.1 The Lower Incentives to Monopolist Innovation 2.4.2 Incentives to Invest in RandD 2.4.3 Models of Competition and Innovation* 2.5 Public Policies and Incentives to Innovate 2.5.1 Ex Ante v. Ex Post: Property Rights Protection 2.5.2 Essential Facilities 2.5.3 Price Controls and Structural Remedies 2.5.4 Internai v. External Growth 2.6 Monopoly: Will the Market Fix it All? 2.6.1 Durable Good Monopolist 2.6.2 Contestable Markets 2.6.3 Monopoly and Free Entry 2.7 Summary and Policy Conclusions 2.8 Exercises 2.8.1 Solutions to Exercises 3 Market Definition and the Assessment of Market Power 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Market Definition 3.2.1 Product Market Definition 3.2.2 Geographic Market Definition 3.3 The Assessment of Market Power 3.3.1 Traditional Approach: (Indirect) Assessment of Market Power 3.3.2 Econometric Techniques: (Direct) Assessment of Market Power* 3.4 Exercises 3.4.1 Solutions to Exercises 4 Collusion and Horizontal Agreements 4.1 Introduction 4.1.1 What is Collusion? 4.2 Factors That Facilitate Collusion 4.2.1 Structural Factors 4.2.2 Price Transparency and Exchange of Information 4.2.3 Pricing Rules and Contracts 4.2.4 Analysis of Collusion: Conclusions 4.2.5 Factors That Facilitate Collusion* 4.3 Advanced Material** 4.3.1 Credibility of Punishment and Optimal Penal Codes** 4.3.2 Cartels and Renegotiation** 52 52 55 56 58 58 64 65 66 69 70 70 71 73 75 89 89 94 101 101 102 102 113 115 117 124 134 135 137 137 138 142 142 150 156 159 159 167 167 171 4.3.3 The Green ­ Porter (1984) Model** 4.3.4 Symmetry and Collusion** 4.4 Practice: What Should Be Legal and What Illegal? 4.4.1 Standards of Proof: Market Data v. Hard Evidence 4.4.2 Ex Ante Competition Policies against Collusion 4.4.3 Ex Post Competition Policies against Collusion 4.5 Joint-Ventures and Other Horizontal Agreements 4.5.1 Joint-Ventures 4.5.2 Research Joint-Ventures 4.5.3 Other Forms of Co-Operation Regarding Technology 4.5.4 Co-Operative RandD* 4.6 A Case of Parallel Behaviour: Wood pulp 4.7 Exercises 4.7.1 Solutions to Exercises 5 Horizontal Mergers 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Unilateral Effects 5.2.1 Absent Efficiencies, a Merger Increases Market Power 5.2.2 Variables Which Affect Unilateral Market Power 5.2.3 Efficiency Gains 5.2.4 Modelling Unilateral Effects of Mergers* 5.3 Pro-Collusive Effects 5.3.1 Factors which Affect Collusion (Reminder) 5.3.2 Efficiency Gains and Pro-Collusive Effects 5.4 A More General Model** 5.4.1 The Model 5.4.2 Unilateral Effects, without Efficiency Gains 5.4.3 Efficiency Gains from Mergers 5.4.4 Efficiency Offence: When the Merger Leads to the Exit of the Outsiders 5.4.5 Proofs 5.5 Merger Remedies 5.5.1 Divestitures 5.5.2 Behavioural Remedies 5.6 Merger Policy in the European Union 5.6.1 Dominance Test 5.6.2 The Treatment of Efficiency Gains 5.6.3 Conclusions 5.7 Case Studies 5.7.1 How to Proceed in Merger Cases 5.7.2 Nestlé/Perrier 5.7.3 ABB/Daimler-Benz 5.8 Exercises 5.8.1 Solutions to Exercises 175 178 185 185 190 192 202 202 203 206 208 211 219 224 231 231 233 233 234 238 243 250 251 252 252 252 253 257 261 263 265 266 268 270 271 273 276 277 278 279 286 292 295 6 Vertical Restraints and Vertical Mergers 6.1 What are Vertical Restraints? 6.1.1 Plan of the Chapter 6.2 Intra-Brand Competition 6.2.1 Double Marginalisation 6.2.2 Horizontal Externality: Free-Riding in the Provision of Services 6.2.3 A More General Treatment* 6.2.4 Other Efficiency Reasons for Vertical Restraints and Vertical Mergers 6.2.5 Vertical Restraints, Vertical Mergers, and the Commitment Problem 6.2.6 Conclusions 6.3 Inter-Brand Competition 6.3.1 Strategic Effects of Vertical Restraints 6.3.2 Vertical Restraints as Collusive Devices 6.4 Anti-Competitive Effects: Leverage and Foreclosure 6.4.1 Anti-Competitive Effects: Exclusive Dealing 6.4.2 Exclusionary Effects of Vertical Mergers 6.5 Conclusions and Policy Implications 6.6 Cases 6.6.1 General Electric/Honeywell 6.6.2 Ice-Cream 6.7 Exercises 6.7.1 Solutions to Exercises 7 Predation, Monopolisation, and Other Abusive Practices 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Predatory Pricing 7.2.1 Predation: Search for a Theory 7.2.2 Recent Theories of Predatory Pricing 7.2.3 Models of Predatory Pricing* 7.2.4 Practice: How to Deal with Predatory Pricing Allegations 7.3 Non-Price Monopolisation Practices 7.3.1 Strategic Investments 7.3.2 Bundling and Tying 7.3.3 Incompatibility and Other Strategic Behaviour in Network Industries 7.3.4 Refusal to Supply and Exclusive Contracts (Reminder) 7.3.5 Raising Rivals' Costs 7.4 Price Discrimination 7.4.1 Welfare Effects of Price Discrimination 7.4.2 Price Discrimination* 302 302 305 306 307 313 323 333 338 347 347 348 358 362 363 372 377 378 379 391 398 403 411 411 412 413 415 422 442 454 454 460 483 490 490 491 493 502 7.5 US y. Microsoft 7.5.1 A Short Description of the Case 7.5.2 Monopolisation 7.5.3 Attempted Monopolisation 7.5.4 Tying 7.5.5 Remedies 7.5.6 Conclusions 7.5.7 The District Court Judgment on Remedies 7.6 Exercises 7.6.1 Solutions to Exercises 8 A Toolkit: Game Theory and Imperfect Competition Models 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Monopoly 8.2.1 Single-Product Monopoly 8.2.2 Multi-Product Monopoly 8.3 An Introduction to Elementary Game Theory 8.3.1 Nash Equilibrium 8.3.2 Dynamic Games and Sub-Game Perfect Nash Equilibrium 8.4 Oligopoly I: Market Competition in Static Games 8.4.1 Product Market Competition with Homogenous Goods 8.4.2 Product Market Competition with (Exogenously) Differentiated Goods 8.4.3 Repeated Product Market Interaction 8.5 Oligopoly II: Dynamic Games 8.5.1 Strategic Investments 8.6 Appendix Bibliography References to Cases and Legislation Index 511 511 513 520 520 522 522 523 524 528 533 533 533 533 535 542 543 548 551 551 561 570 572 573 578 581 599 605

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