When should firms share credit with employees? Evidence from anonymously managed mutual funds
Author: Massa, Massimo ; Reuter, Jonathan ; Zitzewitz, EricINSEAD Area: FinanceIn: Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 95, no. 3, March 2010 Language: EnglishDescription: p. 400-424.Type of document: INSEAD ArticleNote: Please ask us for this itemAbstract: We study the choice between named and anonymous mutual fund managers. We argue that fund families weigh the benefits of naming managers against the cost associated with their increased future bargaining power. Named managers receive more media mentions, have greater inflows, and suffer less return diversion due to within family cross-subsidization, but departures of named managers reduce net flows. Naming managers became less common between 1993 and 2004. This was especially true in the asset classes and cities most affected by the hedge fund boom, which increased outside opportunities for, and the cost of retaining, successful named managers| Item type | Current location | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds |
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We study the choice between named and anonymous mutual fund managers. We argue that fund families weigh the benefits of naming managers against the cost associated with their increased future bargaining power. Named managers receive more media mentions, have greater inflows, and suffer less return diversion due to within family cross-subsidization, but departures of named managers reduce net flows. Naming managers became less common between 1993 and 2004. This was especially true in the asset classes and cities most affected by the hedge fund boom, which increased outside opportunities for, and the cost of retaining, successful named managers
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