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Rules, games, and common-pool resources

Author: Ostrom, Elinor ; Gardner, Roy ; Walker, JamesPublisher: University of Michigan Press, 1994.Language: EnglishDescription: 369 p. ; 23 cm.ISBN: 9780472065462Type of document: BookBibliography/Index: Includes bibliographical references and index
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Item type Current location Collection Call number Status Date due Barcode Item holds
Book Asia Campus
Print HB846.5 .O78 1994
(Browse shelf)
Available 900228654
Book Europe Campus
Main Collection
Print HB846.5 .O78 1994
(Browse shelf)
Available 001197742
Total holds: 0

Includes bibliographical references and index


Rules, Games and Common-Pool Resources Contents Tables Figures xiii xv Part 1. Theoretical Background Chapter 1. Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resource Problems Common-Pool Resource Problems Conceptual Foundations and Key Terms Classifying CPR Situations: Appropriation and Provision CPR Situations and CPR Dilemmas Coordinated Strategies to Resolve CPR Dilemmas The Central Questions to Be Addressed The Plan for This Book Chapter 2. Institutional Analysis and Common-Pool Resources 23 Models, Theories, and Frameworks Historical Roots of IAD The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework The Action Situation Actors Factors Affecting Action Arenas Linking Action Arenas Multiple Levels of Analysis Multiple Levels of Analysis and Solving Higher-Order Dilemmas Conclusions Chapter 3. Games Appropriators Play The Use of Formal Models CPR Games with Two Players and Two Strategies Repeated CPR Games Conclusions Chapter 4. Rules and Games How Rules Affect the Structure of a Game 51 3 75 Some Empirical Examples of Changes in Authority Rules Fishing Rules and Fishing Games Outcome Comparison Conclusions Part 2. Experimental Studies Chapter 5. CPR Baseline Appropriation Experiments CPR Appropriation Appropriation Behavior in the Laboratory Conclusions Appendix 5.1.: CPR Provision Problems Zero Provision Environments and a Simple Contribution Mechanism Discrete Public Goods and VCM Discrete Public Goods and Alternative Contribution Mechanisms Appendix 5.2.: Experimental Numbers Appendix 5.3.: Market 2 Group Investment Decisions Chapter 6. Probabilistic Destruction of the CPR Model of a Destructible CPR Finite Deterministic Repetition of the Constituent Game The Experimental Design Experimental Results Conclusions Appendix 6.1.: Across Period Behavior: Tokens Invested in Market 2 Chapter 7. Communication in the Commons Communication: Theoretical Issues One-Shot Costless Communication Repeated Costless Communication Costly Communication Conclusions Chapter 8. Sanctioning and Communication Institutions Sanctioning in the Constituent Game The Experimental Setting and Results Conclusions Chapter 9. Regularities from the Laboratory and Possible Explanations Why So Much Cooperation in Communication Experiments? Conclusions 171 105 129 145 195 Part 3. Field Studies Chapter 10. Institutions and Performance in Irrigation Systems by Shui Yan Tang Comparing Irrigation Systems Performance Measures and Linkages among Action Arenas Matching Rules to Physical Domains Multiple Levels of Institutional Arrangements Monitoring and Enforcement Arrangements Conclusions Appendix 10.1.: Case Profiles Chapter 11. Fishers' Institutional Responses to CommonPool Resource Dilemmas by Edella Schlager Coastal Fisheries as Common-Pool Resource Dilemmas CPR Dilemmas, Complexity, and Coastal Fisheries Fishers' Responses to CPR Dilemmas Commons Dilemmas and Organized Fishers Performance of Fishers' Organizations Conclusions Chapter 12. Rules, Rule Making, and Rule Breaking: Examining the Fit between Rule Systems and Resource Use by Arun Agrawal The Historical Context The Local Context Authority Rules Related to Allocation Monitoring Sanctioning Arbitration Conclusions Chapter 13. Changing Rules, Changing Games: Evidence from Groundwater Systems in Southern California by William Blomquist Groundwater Basins as Common-Pool Resources The Levels of Action Linked Action Arenas Operational-Level Rule Configurations Operational-Level Rules and Game Structure 225 247 267 283 Rules, Actions, and Outcomes: Evidence from the Cases Conclusions Chapter 14. Regularities from the Field and Possible Explanations by William Blomquist, Edella Schlager, Shui Yan Tang, and Elinor Ostrom Commonalities across Organized CPRs Differences across Organized CPRs Physical Characteristics That Make a Difference Conclusions 301 Part 4. Conclusion Chapter 15. Cooperation and Social Capital Theoretical Choices in Doing Policy Analysis Surmounting CPR Dilemmas Bibliography Contributors Index 319 331 361 363

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