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Individual strategy and social structure: an evolutionary theory of institutions

Author: Young, H. Peyton Publisher: Princeton University Press, 2001.Language: EnglishDescription: 189 p. : Graphs/Ill. ; 24 cm.ISBN: 9780691086873Type of document: BookBibliography/Index: Includes bibliographical references and index
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Item type Current location Collection Call number Status Date due Barcode Item holds
Book Europe Campus
Main Collection
Print HM131 .Y68 2001
(Browse shelf)
001252507
Available 001252507
Total holds: 0

Includes bibliographical references and index

Digitized

Individual Strategy and Social Structure An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions Contents Preface Acknowledgments CHAPTER 1. Overview CHAPTER 2. Learning 2.1 Varieties of Learning Behavior 2.2 Recurrent Games 2.3 Fictitious Play 2.4 Potential Games 2.5 Nonconvergence of Fictitious Play 2.6 Adoptive Play CHAPTER 3. Dynamic and Stochastic Stability 3.1 Asymptotic Stability 3.2 Stochastic Stability 3.3 Elements of Markov Chain Theory 3.4 Perturbed Markov Processes 3.5 The Neighborhood Segregation Model CHAPTER 4. Adaptive Learning in Small Games 4.1 Risk Dominance 4.2 Stochastic Stability and Risk Dominance in 2 x 2 Games 4.3 Who Goes First? 4.4 Playing the Field 4.5 Computing the Stationary Distribution CHAPTER 5. Variations on the Learning Process 5.1 Heterogeneity in Information 5.2 Heterogeneity in Payoffs 5.3 Alternative Models of Noise 5.4 Unbounded Memory 5.5 Other Learning Models xi xv 3 25 27 30 30 36 38 41 44 44 46 48 54 62 66 66 68 71 72 73 77 77 80 80 83 89 CHAPTER 6. Local Interaction 6.1 Games Played on Graphs 6.2 Interaction Structure and Speed of Adjustment CHAPTER 7. Equilibrium and Disequilibrium Selection in General Games 7.1 Coordination Games 7.2 Weakly Acyclic Games 7.3 Curb Sets 7.4 Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies CHAPTER 8. Bargaining 8.1 Focal Points 8.2 Adaptive Learning in Bargaining 8.3 Sketch of the Proof of Theorem 8.1 8.4 Variations on the Bargaining Model 8.5 Heterogeneous Populations 8.6 Bargaining with Incomplete Information 8.7 Fifty-Fifty Division CHAPTER 9. Contracts 9.1 Choice of Contracts as a Coordination Game 9.2 Maximin Contracts 9.3 A Contract Selection Theorem 9.4 The Marriage Game 9.5 Examples Showing Departures from Strict Efficiency and Exact Maximin 9.6 Small Games and Symmetric Coordination Games 9.7 The Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution 9.8 Correlated Shocks CHAPTER 10. Conclusion Appendix: Proofs of Selected Theorems Notes Bibliography Index 91 92 98 103 103 106 109 112 113 113 118 120 124 126 128 129 131 132 133 134 136 138 140 141 142 144 151 173 177 185

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