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A Game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation

Author: Ray, Debraj Series: Lipsey lectures Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP) 2007.Language: EnglishDescription: 321 p. : Graphs ; 24 cm.ISBN: 9780199207954Type of document: BookBibliography/Index: Includes bibliographical references and index
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Item type Current location Collection Call number Status Date due Barcode Item holds
Book Europe Campus
Main Collection
Print HB144 .R39 2007
(Browse shelf)
32419001252330
Available 32419001252330
Total holds: 0

Includes bibliographical references and index

Digitized

A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation Contents Preface Chapter 1. Introduction Part 1 The Setting Chapter 2. Ingredients for a Theory of Agreements 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Characteristic Functions and Cooperative Games 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 Two Approaches to Coalition Formation Farsightedness Two Examples Negotiations: One-Time or Continuing? vii 1 7 9 9 10 14 15 16 20 23 23 24 27 32 33 35 37 37 38 41 41 46 47 Chapter 3. Coalitions, Cooperation and Noncooperation 3.1 Definitions and Notation 3.2 Coalitional Equilibrium 3.3 Partition Functions 3.4 Extensions 3.5 Summary Part 2 A Bargaining Approach To Coalition Formation Chapter 4. Irreversible Agreements 4.1 Introduction 4.2 A Model 4.3 Equilibrium 4.4 Rubinstein-Ståhl Bargaining 4.5 Baron-Ferejohn Bargaining 4.6 Summary Chapter 5. Irreversible Agreements: Symmetric Games 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 Symmetric Partition Functions An Algorithm Connecting the Algorithm to Equilibria A Remark on Nontransferable Payoffs 53 54 55 56 67 68 80 83 83 87 93 102 105 106 108 111 113 125 130 140 145 152 155 156 158 161 164 166 167 169 170 172 173 178 181 183 184 5.5 Proofs 5.6 Summary Chapter 6. Applications 6.1 Cournot Oligopoly 6.2 Public Goods 6.3 Proofs 6.4 Summary Chapter 7. Irreversible Agreements: The General Case 7.1 Characteristic Functions and the Core 7.2 Equilibrium Response Vectors 7.3 No-Delay Equilibrium 7.4 Condition M, Payoffs and Coalition Structure 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 More on Efficiency Externalities Revisited Alternative Protocols Proofs Summary An Example A Proposal-Based Model of Coalition Formation Binding Agreements Strategies and Equilibrium Absorption and Efficiency Summary Chapter 8. A Framework for Reversible Agreements Chapter 9. Reversible Agreements Without Externalities 9.1 Two Examples 9.2 Benignness 9.3 Absorption and Efficiency 9.4 Proofs 9.5 Summary Chapter 10. Reversible Agreements With Externalities 10.1 The Baseline Model for Three-Player Games 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 The Baseline Model for Four or More Players Superadditive Games Upfront Transfers and the Failure of Efficiency Summary 187 192 194 198 211 213 213 215 215 219 220 221 222 224 227 230 236 241 243 243 244 246 250 261 271 276 287 288 289 292 294 296 299 301 303 304 307 315 319 Part 3 A Blocking Approach to Coalition Formation Chapter 11. Blocking 11.1 The Core Revisited 11.2 Farsightedness in Blocking 11.3 A First Pass at Farsightedness 11.4 Externalities and Farsightedness 11.5 Summary Chapter 12. Irreversible Commitments 12.1 Equilibrium Binding Agreements 12.2 Farsightedness and Prediction 12.3 Inefficiency 12.4 An Application to Political Party Formation 12.5 Beyond Nested Deviations 12.6 Summary Chapter 13. The Blocking Approach in Real Time 13.1 Introduction 13.2 An Informal Description 13.3 A Process of Coalition Formation 13.4 Deterministic Equilibrium Processes 13.5 Stochastic Equilibrium Processes 13.6 Proofs 13.7 Summary Chapter 14. Directions 14.1 Coalition Formation Without Unanimity 14.2 Equity Within Coalitions 14.3 Coalition Formation With Deliberate Exit 14.4 Overlapping Coalitions 14.5 Networks 14.6 Coalition Formation With Nonbinding Agreements 14.7 Incomplete Information 14.8 Nontransferable Utility 14.9 Axiomatic Approaches References Subject Index Author Index

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