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Organization at the limit: lessons from the Columbia disaster

Author: Starbuck, William H. ; Farjoun, MoshePublisher: Blackwell, 2005.Language: EnglishDescription: 387 p. : Graphs ; 17 cm.ISBN: 9781405131087Type of document: BookBibliography/Index: Includes bibliographical references and index
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Item type Current location Collection Call number Status Date due Barcode Item holds
Book Europe Campus
Main Collection
Print HD6953 .O744 2005
(Browse shelf)
001251753
Available 001251753
Total holds: 0

Includes bibliographical references and index

Digitized

Organization at the Limit Lessons from the Columbia Disaster Contents Notes on Contributors Preface Sean O'Keefe viii xvii Part I Introduction 1 Introduction: Organizational Aspects of the Columbia Disaster Moshe Farjoun and William H. Starbuck Synopsis: NASA, the CAIB Report, and the Columbia Disaster Moshe Farjoun and William H. Starbuck 1 3 11 Part II The Context of the Disaster 2 History and Policy at the Space Shuttle Program Moshe Farjoun 3 System Effects: On Slippery Slopes, Repeating Negative Patterns, and Learning from Mistake? Diane Vaughan 4 Organizational Learning and Action in the Midst of Safety Drift: Revisiting the Space Shuttle Program's Recent History Moshe Farjoun 5 The Space Between in Space Transportation: A Relational Analysis of the Failure of STS-107 Karlene H. Roberts, Peter M. Madsen, and Vinit M. Desai 19 21 41 60 81 Part III Influences on Decision-Making 6 The Opacity of Risk: Language and the Culture of Safety in NASA's Space Shuttle Program William Ocasio 7 Coping with Temporal Uncertainty: When Rigid, Ambitious Deadlines Don't Make Sense Sally Blount, Mary J. Waller, and Sophie Leroy 8 Attention to Production Schedule and Safety as Determinants of Risk-Taking in NASA's Decision to Launch the Columbia Shuttle Angela Buljan and Zur Shapira 99 l01 122 140 Part IV The Imaging Debate 9 Making Sense of Blurred Images: Mindful Organizing in Mission STS-107 Karl E. Weick 10 The Price of Progress: Structurally Induced Inaction Scott A. Snook and Jeffrey C. Connor 11 Data Indeterminacy: One NASA, Two Modes Roger Dunbar and Raghu Garud 12 The Recovery Window: Organizational Learning Following Ambiguous Threats Amy C. Edmondson, Michael A. Roberto, Richard M.J. Bohmer, Erika M. Ferlins, and Laura R. Feldman 13 Barriers to the Interpretation and Diffusion of Information about Potential Problems in Organizations: Lessons from the Space Shuttle Columbia Frances J. Milliken, Theresa K. Lant, and Ebony N. Bridwell-Mitchell 157 159 178 202 220 246 Part V Beyond Explanation 14 Systems Approaches to Safety: NASA and the Space Shuttle Disasters Nancy Leveson, Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld, John S. Carroll, Betty Barrett, Alexander Brown, Nicolas Du lac, and Karen Marais 15 Creating Foresight: Lessons for Enhancing Resilience from Columbia David D. Woods 16 Making NASA More Effective William H. Starbuck and Johnny Stephenson 267 269 289 309 17 Observations on the Columbia Accident Henry McDonald 336 Part VI Conclusion 18 Lessons from the Columbia Disaster Moshe Farjoun and William H. Starbuck 347 349 Index of Citations Subject Index 364 370

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