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The Bounds of reason: game theory and the unification of the behavioral sciences

Author: Gintis, Herbert Publisher: Princeton University Press, 2009.Language: EnglishDescription: 286 p. : Graphs ; 26 cm.ISBN: 9780691140520Type of document: BookBibliography/Index: Includes bibliographical references and index
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Item type Current location Collection Call number Status Date due Barcode Item holds
Book Europe Campus
Main Collection
Print HB144 .G56 2009
(Browse shelf)
001308051
Available 001308051
Total holds: 0

Includes bibliographical references and index

Digitized

The Bounds of reason Game theory and the unification of the behavioral sciences Contents Preface 1 Decision Theory and Human Behavior 1.1 Beliefs, Preferences, and Constraints 1.2 The Meaning of Rational Action 1.3 Why Are Preferences Consistent? 1.4 Time Inconsistency 1.5 Bayesian Rationality and Subjective Priors 1.6 The Biological Basis for Expected Utility 1.7 The Allais and Ellsberg Paradoxes 1.8 Risk and the Shape of the Utility Function 1.9 Prospect Theory 1.10 Heuristics and Biases in Decision Making 2 Game Theory: Basic Concepts 2.1 The Extensive Form 2.2 The Normal Form 2.3 Mixed Strategies 2.4 Nash Equilibrium 2.5 The Fundamental Theorem of Game Theory 2.6 Solving for Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria 2.7 Throwing Fingers 2.8 The Battle of the Sexes 2.9 The Hawk-Dove Game 2.10 The Prisoner's Dilemma 2.11 Alice, Bob, and the Choreographer 2.12 An Efficiency-Enhancing Choreographer 2.13 The Correlated Equilibrium Solution Concept 3 Game Theory and Human Behavior 3.1 Self- and Other-Regarding Preferences xiii 1 4 6 7 8 11 16 16 18 21 26 30 30 33 34 35 36 37 38 38 39 40 41 43 44 45 46 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 3.11 3.12 3.13 3.14 3.15 Methodological Issues in Behavioral Game Theory An Anonymous Market Exchange The Rationality of Altruistic Giving Conditional Altruistic Cooperation Altruistic Punishment Strong Reciprocity in the Labor Market Altruistic Third-Party Punishment Altruism and Cooperation in Groups Inequality Aversion The Trust Game Character Virtues The Situational Character of Preferences The Dark Side of Altruistic Cooperation Norms of Cooperation: Cross-Cultural Variation 49 52 54 56 57 59 61 64 68 71 73 75 77 78 4 Rationalizability and Common Knowledge of Rationality 83 4.1 Epistemic Games 83 4.2 A Simple Epistemic Game 86 4.3 An Epistemic Battle of the Sexes 87 4.4 Dominated and Iteratedly Dominated Strategies 88 4.5 Eliminating Weakly Dominated Strategies 89 4.6 Rationalizable Strategies 90 4.7 Eliminating Strongly Dominated Strategies 92 4.8 Common Knowledge of Rationality 93 4.9 Rationalizability and Common Knowledge of Rationality 94 4.10 The Beauty Contest 94 4.11 The Traveler's Dilemma 95 4.12 The Modified Traveler's Dilemma 96 4.13 Global Games 98 4.14 CKR Is an Event, Not a Premise 100 5 Extensive Form Rationalizability 5.1 Backward Induction and Dominated Strategies 5.2 Subgame Perfection 5.3 Subgame Perfection and Incredible Threats 5.4 The Surprise Examination 5.5 The Common Knowledge of Logicality Paradox 5.6 The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma 102 102 104 105 105 106 107 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 5.11 5.12 5.13 The Centipede Game CKR Fails Off the Backward Induction Path How to Play the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma The Modal Logic of Knowledge Backward Induction and Extensive Form CKR Rationality and Extensive Form CKR On the Nonexistence of CKR 108 110 112 114 115 118 119 121 121 123 125 128 128 129 132 133 134 135 136 136 138 139 141 143 143 144 146 146 147 149 152 153 156 158 161 6 The Mixing Problem: Purification and Conjectures 6.1 Why Play Mixed Strategies? 6.2 Harsanyi's Purification Theorem 6.3 A Reputational Model of Honesty and Corruption 6.4 Purifying Honesty and Corruption 6.5 Epistemic Games: Mixed Strategies as Conjectures 6.6 Resurrecting the Conjecture Approach to Purification 7 Bayesian Rationality and Social Epistemology 7.1 The Sexes: From Battle to Ballet 7.2 The Choreographer Trumps Backward Induction 7.3 Property Rights and Correlated Equilibrium 7.4 Convention as Correlated Equilibrium 7.5 Correlated Strategies and Correlated Equilibria 7.6 Correlated Equilibrium and Bayesian Rationality 7.7 The Social Epistemology of Common Priors 7.8 The Social Epistemology of Common Knowledge 7.9 Social Norms 7.10 Game Theory and the Evolution of Norms 7.11 The Merchants' Wares 8 Common Knowledge and Nash Equilibrium 8.1 Conditions for a Nash Equilibrium in Two-Player Games 8.2 A Three-Player Counterexample 8.3 The Modal Logic of Common Knowledge 8.4 The Commonality of Knowledge 8.5 The Tactful Ladies 8.6 The Tactful Ladies and the Commonality of Knowledge 8.7 Agreeing to Disagree 8.8 The Demise of Methodological Individualism 9 Reflective Reason and Equilibrium Refinements 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.7 9.8 9.9 9.10 9.11 9.12 9.13 9.14 Perfect, Perfect Bayesian, and Sequential Equilibria Incredible Threats Unreasonable Perfect Bayesian Equilibria The LBR criterion picks out the sequential equilibrium Selten's Horse: Sequentiality vs. the LBR criterion The Spence Signaling Model Irrelevant Node Additions Improper Sequential Equilibria Second-Order Forward Induction Beer and Quiche Without the Intuitive Criterion An Unreasonable Perfect Equilibrium The Principle of Insufficient Reason The Principle of Honest Communication Induction: Forward is Robust, Backward is Fragile 164 166 167 170 171 171 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 179 180 181 181 183 185 10 The Analytics of Human Sociality 10.1 Explaining Cooperation: An Overview 10.2 Bob and Alice Redux 10.3 The Folk Theorem 10.4 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 188 10.5 Cooperation with Private Signaling 10.6 One Cheer For the Folk Theorem 10.7 Altruistic Punishing in the Public Goods Game 10.8 The Failure of Models of Self-Regarding Cooperation 11 The Evolution of Property Rights 11.1 The Endowment Effect 11.2 Territoriality 11.3 Property Rights in Young Children 11.4 Respect for Possession in Nonhuman Animals 11.5 Conditions for a Property Equilibrium 11.6 Property and Antiproperty Equilibria 11.7 An Antiproperty Equilibrium 11.8 Property Rights as Choreographer 12 The Unification of the Behavioral Sciences 12.1 Gene-Culture Coevolution: The Biological Model 193 195 197 200 201 201 204 207 207 210 213 217 220 221 223 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.6 12.7 12.8 12.9 12.10 12.11 12.12 12.13 12.14 12.15 13 Summary Culture and Physiology of Human Communication Biological and Cultural Dynamics The Theory of Norms: The Sociological Model Socialization and the Internalization of Norms Rational Choice: The Economic Model Deliberative Choice: The Psychological Model Application: Addictive Behavior Game Theory: The Universal Lexicon of Life Epistemic Game Theory and Social Norms Society as a Complex Adaptive System Counterpoint: Biology Counterpoint: Economics Counterpoint: Psychology The Behavioral Disciplines Can Be Unified 228 229 231 233 234 236 238 239 240 242 244 245 245 247 248 250 253 283 14 Table of Symbols References Index

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