INSEAD Library

Includes bibliographical references and index

Digitized

Mathematical Models of Social Evolution: A Guide for the Perplexed Contents Preface 1 Theoretician's Laboratory 1.2 The utility of simple models ............................................. 1.3 Why not just simulate? ................................................... 1.4 A model of viability selection ............................................. 1.5 Determining long-term consequences ............................. 1.6 Nongenetic replication ...................................................... ix 1 4 8 11 16 27 1.1 The structure of evolutionary theory ............................... 3 2 Animal Conflict 37 2.1 The Hawk-Dove game ........................................................ 38 2.2 Retaliation ........................................................................ 46 2.3 Continuous stable strategies .......................................... 52 2.4 Ownership, an asymmetry .............................................. 55 2.5 Resource holding power ................................................... 58 2.6 Sequential play ................................................................ 60 3 Altruism and Inclusive Fitness 71 3.1 The prisoner's dilemma ................................................... 72 3.2 Positive assortment .......................................................... 76 3.3 Common descent and inclusive fitness ............................................................................ 78 3.4 Rediscovering Hamilton's rule .......................................... 82 3.5 Justifying Hamilton's rule ............................................... 97 3.6 Using Hamilton's rule ...................................................... 99 4 Reciprocity 4.1 The Axelrod-Hamilton model .......................................... 4.2 Mutants and mistakes ................................................. 4.3 Partner choice................................................................. 4.4 Indirect reciprocity ......................................................... 123 124 132 145 150 4.5 Reciprocity and collective action .................................... 156 5 Animal Communication 173 5.1 Costly signaling theory .................................................. 174 5.2 Cheap, honest signals .................................................. 192 5.3 Signaling and altruism ................................................. 201 5.4 Social learning ............................................................... 206 6 Selection among Groups 6.1 Three views of selection ................................................... 6.2 Deriving the Price equation ........................................... 6.3 Selection within and between groups ........................... 6.4 Dispersal ....................................................................... 7 Sex Allocation 7.1 Fisher's theory of sex allocation .................................... 7.2 Reproductive value and Fisherian sex ratios ................ 7.3 Using the Shaw-Mohler theorem ................................... 7.4 Biased sex ratios ........................................................... 7.5 Breaking the eigen barrier ............................................. 8 Sexual Selection 223 225 228 232 249 261 262 263 267 271 281 295 8.1 Quantitative genetic models .......................................... 298 8.2 Fisher's runaway process ............................................. 305 8.3 Costly choice and sensory bias ..................................... 309 8.4 Good genes and sexy sons ............................................ 313 Appendixes A Facts about Derivatives .................................................... B Facts about Random Variables ........................................ C Calculating Binomial Expectations .................................. D Numerical Solution of the Kokko et al. Model . . . ........... E Solutions to Problems ....................................................... Bibliography Index 333 333 335 337 343 349 393 409