Normal view MARC view

Why are there so many banking crises? The politics and policy of bank regulation

Author: Rochet, Jean-Charles Publisher: Princeton University Press, 2008.Language: EnglishDescription: 308 p. : Graphs/Ill. ; 24 cm.ISBN: 9780691131467Type of document: BookBibliography/Index: Includes bibliographical references
Tags: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.
Item type Current location Collection Call number Status Date due Barcode Item holds
Book Europe Campus
Main Collection
Print HG1616 .C7 R63 2008
(Browse shelf)
001244618
Available 001244618
Total holds: 0

Includes bibliographical references

Digitized

Why Are There So Many Banking Crises? The Politics and Policy of Bank Regulation Contents Preface and Acknowledgments General Introduction and Outline of the Book References PART 1. WHY ARE THERE SO MANY BANKING CRISES? Chapter 1. Why Are There So Many Banking Crises? Jean-Charles Rochet 1.1 Introduction 1.2 The Sources of Banking Fragility 1.3 The Lender of Last Resort 1.4 Deposit Insurance and Solvency Regulations 1.5 Lessons from Recent Crises 1.6 The Future of Banking Supervision References PART 2. THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT Chapter 2. Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right After All? Jean-Charles Rochet and Xavier Vives 2.1 Introduction 2.2 The Model 2.3 Runs and Solvency 2.4 Equilibrium of the Investors' Game 2.5 Coordination Failure and Prudential Regulation 2.6 Coordination Failure and LLR Policy 2.7 Endogenizing the Liability Structure and Crisis Resolution 2.8 An International LLR 2.9 Concluding Remarks References ix 1 14 19 21 21 23 24 27 28 30 33 35 37 37 41 44 47 53 55 58 63 66 67 Chapter 3. The Lender of Last Resort: A Twenty-First-Century Approach Xavier Freixas, Bruno M. Parigi, and Jean-Charles Rochet 3.1 Introduction 3.2 The Model 3.3 Efficient Supervision: Detection and Closure of Insolvent Banks 3.4 Efficient Closure 3.5 Central Bank Lending 3.6 Efficient Allocation in the Presence of Gambling for Resurrection 3.7 Policy Implications and Conclusions 3.8 Appendix References PART 3. PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AND THE MANAGEMENT OF SYSTEMIC RISK Chapter 4. Macroeconomic Shocks and Banking Supervision Jean-Charles Rochet 4.1 Introduction 4.2 A Brief Survey of the Literature 4.3 A Simple Model of Prudential Regulation without Macroeconomic Shocks 4.4 How to Deal with Macroeconomic Shocks? 4.5 Is Market Discipline Useful? 4.6 Policy Recommendations for Macroprudential Regulation References Chapter 5. Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole 5.1 Benchmark: No Interbank Lending 5.2 Date-0 Monitoring and Optimal Interbank Loans 5.3 Date-1 Monitoring, Too Big to Fail, and Bank Failure Propagations 5.4 Conclusion 5.5 Appendix: Solution of Program (P) References Chapter 6. Controlling Risk in Payment Systems Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole 6.1 Taxonomy of Payment Systems 6.2 Three Illustrations 6.3 An Economic Approach to Payment Systems 6.4 Centralization versus Decentralization 6.5 An Analytical Framework 6.6 Conclusion References 71 71 75 81 85 89 95 97 98 101 103 105 105 106 108 112 118 121 123 126 132 139 148 153 155 157 159 161 166 173 181 184 191 192 Chapter 7. Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations, and the Central Bank Xavier Freixas, Bruno M. Parigi, and Jean-Charles Rochet 7.1 The Model 7.2 Pure Coordination Problems 7.3 Resiliency and Market Discipline in the Interbank System 7.4 Closure-Triggered Contagion Risk 7.5 Too-Big-to-Fail and Money Center Banks 7.6 Discussions and Conclusions 7.7 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 7.1References PART 4. SOLVENCY REGULATIONS Chapter 8. Capital Requirements and the Behavior of Commercial Banks Jean-Charles Rochet 8.1 Introduction 8.2 The Model 8.3 The Behavior of Banks in the Complete Markets Setup 8.4 The Portfolio Model 8.5 The Behavior of Banks in the Portfolio Model without Capital Requirements 8.6 Introducing Capital Requirements into the Portfolio Model 8.7 Introducing Limited Liability into the Portfolio Model 8.8 Conclusion 8.9 Appendix 8.10 An Example of an Increase in the Default Probability Consecutive to the Adoption of the Capital Requirement References Chapter 9. Rebalancing the Three Pillars of Basel II Jean-Charles Rochet 9.1 Introduction 9.2 The Three Pillars in the Academic Literature 9.3 A Formal Model 9.4 Justifying the Minimum Capital Ratio 9.5 Market Discipline and Subordinated Debt 9.6 Market Discipline and Supervisory Action 9.7 Conclusion 9.8 Mathematical Appendix References Chapter 10. The Three Pillars of Basel II: Optimizing the Mix Jean-Paul Decamps, Jean-Charles Rochet, and Benoit Roger 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Related Literature 195 199 205 207 210 213 215 217 222 225 227 227 230 231 238 240 244 246 249 250 256 257 258 258 259 260 266 268 269 272 274 277 281 281 284 10,3 The Model 10.4 The Justification of Solvency Requirements 10.5 Market Discipline 10.6 Supervisory Action 10.7 Concluding Remarks 10.8 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 9.2 10.9 Appendix: Optimal Recapitalization by Public Funds Is Infinitesimal (Liquidity Assistance) 10.10 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 9.3 References 287 292 294 298 302 303 303 304 305

There are no comments for this item.

Log in to your account to post a comment.
Koha 18.11 - INSEAD Catalogue
Home | Contact Us | What's Koha?