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The Anatomy of corporate law: a comparative and functional approach

Author: Kraakman, R. ; Davies, Paul ; Hansmann, Henry ; Hertig, Gerard ; Hopt, Klaus J. ; Kanda, Hideki ; Rock, EdwardPublisher: Oxford University Press (OUP) 2004.Language: EnglishDescription: 232 p. ; 23 cm.ISBN: 9780199260645Type of document: BookNote: Doriot: for 2013-2014 coursesBibliography/Index: Includes bibliographical references and index
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Book Europe Campus
Main Collection
Print K710 .K73 2004
(Browse shelf)
001324838
Available 001324838
Book Europe Campus
Main Collection
Print K710 .K73 2004
(Browse shelf)
001324821
Available 001324821
Book Europe Campus
Main Collection
Print K710 .K73 2004
(Browse shelf)
001216831
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Book Middle East Campus
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Print K710 .K73 2004
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Doriot: for 2013-2014 courses

Includes bibliographical references and index

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The Anatomy of Corporate Law A Comparative and Functional Approach Contents List of Authors 1 What is Corporate Law? Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman 1.1 Introduction 1.2 What is a corporation? 1.2.1 Legal personality 1.2.2 Limited liability 1.2.3 Transferable shares 1.2.4 Delegated management with a board structure 1.2.5 Investor ownership 1.3 What does corporate law include? 1.3.1 Secondary and partial corporations forms 1.3.2 Additional sources of corporate law 1.3.3 Non-corporate law constraints 1.4 What is the goal of corporate law? 2 Agency Problems and Legal Strategies Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman 2.1 Three agency problems 2.2 Legal strategies for reducing agency costs 2.2.1 Regulatory strategies 2.2.2 Governance strategies 2.2.3 Ex post and ex ante strategies 2.3 Legal strategies in corporate context 2.4 The role of law 3 The Basic Governance Structure Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman 3.1 How governance strategies protect shareholders as a class 3.1.1 The appointment rights strategy 3.1.2 The other strategies: Decision rights, trusteeship, incentives, constraints, and affiliation rights 3.2 Protecting minority shareholders 3.2.1 The appointment rights strategy 3.2.2 The decision rights strategy 3.2.3 The trusteeship strategy 3.2.4 The reward, constraints, and affiliation rights strategies xv 1 1 5 6 8 10 11 13 15 15 16 17 17 21 21 23 23 26 27 28 29 33 33 34 46 54 54 57 57 59 3.2.5 Reflecting on the minority­majority shareholder conflict 3.3 Protecting non-shareholder constituencies 3.3.1 The appointment rights strategy 3.3.2 The trusteeship strategy 3.3.3 The constraints strategy 3.4 Patterns of corporate governance 4 Creditor Protection Gerard Hertig and Hideki Kanda 4.1 Why should corporate law protect creditors? 4.1.1 Companies in the vicinity of insolvency 4.1.2 Corporate groups 4.1.3 Involuntary creditors 4.2 Regulatory strategies for creditor protection 4.2.1 Mandatory disclosure--The entry strategy 4.2.2 Rules governing legal capital and corporate groups 4.2.3 Fiduciary duties--The standards strategy 4.3 Explaining differences in creditor protection 4.3.1 The extent of divergence 4.3.2 The importance of divergence 5 Related Party Transactions Gerard Hertig and Hideki Kanda 5.1 Conflicted transactions by managers 5.1.1 Mandatory disclosure: The affiliation strategy 5.1.2 Disinterested board approval: The trusteeship strategy 5.1.3 Shareholder voting: The decision rights strategy 5.1.4 Prohibiting conflicted transactions: The rules strategy 5.1.5 The duty of loyalty: The standards strategy 5.2 Transactions involving controlling shareholders 5.2.1 Mandatory disclosure: The affiliation strategy 5.2.2 Board and shareholder ratification: The trusteeship and decision rights strategies 5.2.3 Fiduciary duties and fairness norms: The standards strategy 5.3 Explaining differences in the regulation of related party transactions 6 Significant Corporate Actions Edward Rock, Hideki Kanda and Reinier Kraakman 6.1 What are significant corporate actions? 6.2 Mergers and similar organic changes 6.2.1 The management­shareholder conflict 60 61 62 65 66 67 71 71 73 74 76 77 79 83 88 97 97 98 101 101 103 105 109 111 114 118 119 121 123 128 131 131 133 133 6.2.2 The majority--minority shareholder conflict 6.2.3 The protection of non-shareholder constituencies 6.3 Sales of assets 6.4 Legal capital, share issues, and corporate distributions 6.4.1 The manager--shareholder conflict 6.4.2 The majority--minority shareholder conflict 6.4.3 The protection of non-shareholder constituencies 6.5 Fully delegated decisions: Investment and debt 6.6 Explaining differences in the regulation of significant corporate actions 7 Control Transactions Paul Davies and Klaus Hopt 7.1 Agency problems in control transactions 7.1.1 Control transactions 7.1.2 Agency issues 7.2 Agency problems where shareholdings are dispersed: Two models of regulation 7.2.1 Basic models 7.2.2 The first model: Non-frustration of the offer 7.2.3 The second model: Directors controlling access to the shareholders 7.2.4 Rationales for the second model 7.2.5 Comparing the two models 7.3 Agency problems of dispersed shareholders when a general offer is made 7.3.1 Information asymmetry: The affiliation strategy 7.3.2 Pressure to accept the offer: The reward strategy 7.3.3 The mandatory bid rule: The exit strategy 7.3.4 Competing bids 7.3.5 Acquisition of dissenting minorities 7.4 Agency issues where there are controlling shareholders 7.5 Agency problems of non-shareholder groups 7.6 Explaining differences in the regulation of control transactions 8 Issuers and Investor Protection Gerard Hertig, Reinier Kraakman and Edward Rock 8.1 Two objectives of investor protection 8.2 The entry strategy: Mandatory disclosure 8.2.1 Jurisdictional variations 8.2.2 Accounting methodology 8.2.3 Exiting disclosure requirements 8.2.4 Why make disclosure mandatory? 139 144 14S 145 146 147 151 151 153 157 157 157 159 163 163 164 168 170 172 173 174 176 178 181 183 184 187 189 193 194 195 197 201 202 204 8.3 Quality control: The trusteeship strategy 8.4 Quality control: The rules and standards strategies 8.4.1 The rules strategy 8.4.2 The standards strategy 8.5 Explaining differences in investor protection 9 Beyond the Anatomy Paul Davies, Gerard Hertig and Klaus Hopt 9.1 Our approach 9.2 Putting our results into context 9.3 Existing commonalities 9.3.1 Robustness 9.3.2 Causes of remaining divergence 9.4 Roadmap for further research Index 207 208 209 210 212 215 215 217 218 218 221 222 227

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