INSEAD Library

Includes bibliographical references and index

Digitized

Institutional Dimensions of the Modern Corporation Contents Acknowledgements General Introduction Claude Ménard Introduction Claude Ménard ix xi xix PART I STRUCTURES 1. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. (1980), 'The United States: Seedbed of Managerial Capitalism', in Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. and Herman Daems (eds), Managerial Hierarchies: Comparative Perspectives on the Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise, Chapter 1, Cambridge, MA and London, England: Harvard University Press, 9-40 3 2. Oliver E. Williamson (1981), 'The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes', Journal of Economic Literature, XIX (4), December, 1537-68 35 3. Masahiko Aoki (1990), 'Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm', Journal of Economic Literature, XXVIII (1), March, 1-27 67 4. Henry Ogden Armour and David J. Teece (1978), 'Organizational Structure and Economic Performance: A Test of the Multidivisional Hypothesis', Bell Journal of Economics, 9 (1), Spring, 106-22 94 5. Scott E. Masten, James W. Meehan, Jr. and Edward A. Snyder (1991), `The Costs of Organization', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7 (1), Spring, 1-25 111 PART II CONTROL WITHIN ORGANIZATIONS 6. Roy Radner (1986), 'The Internal Economy of Large Firms', Economic Journal, 96, Supplement: Conference Papers, 1-22 7. Kenneth J. Arrow (1964), 'Control in Large Organizations', Management Science, 10 (3), April, 397-408 8. Oliver E. Williamson (1967), 'Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size', Journal of Political Economy, 75 (2), April, 123-38 9. Masahiko Aoki (1986), 'Horizontal vs. Vertical Information Structure of the Firm', American Economic Review, LXXVI, 971-83 10. Jean Tirole (1986), 'Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2 (2), Fall, 181-214 139 161 173 189 202 11. Gary J. Miller (1990), 'Managerial Dilemmas: Political Leadership in Hierarchies', in Karen Schweers Cook and Margaret Levi (eds), The Limits of Rationality, Chapter 9, Chicago, IL and London: University of Chicago Press, 324-48 236 12. Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole (1997), 'Formal and Real Authority in Organizations', Journal of Political Economy, 105 (1), 1-29 261 13. Gregory K. Dow (1987), 'The Function of Authority in Transaction Cost Economics', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 8 (1), March, 13-38 290 14. Claude Ménard (1994), 'Organizations as Coordinating Devices', Metroeconomica, 45 (3), October, 224-47 316 PART III MOTIVATIONS AND VALUES 15. Jeffrey Pfeffer (1990), 'Incentives in Organizations: The Importance of Social Relations', in Oliver E. Williamson (ed.), Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond, Chapter 4, New York, NY and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 72-97 16. Sherwin Rosen (1988), 'Transactions Costs and Internal Labor Markets', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 4 (1), Spring, 49-64 17. Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom (1991), 'Multitask PrincipalAgent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7, Special Issue, 24-52 18. David M. Kreps (1990), 'Corporate Culture and Economic Theory', in James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle (eds), Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, Chapter 4, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 90-143, notes, references 19. Gareth R. Jones (1983), 'Transaction Costs, Property Rights, and Organizational Culture: An Exchange Perspective', Administrative Science Quarterly, 28 (3), 454-67 20. Mats Alvesson and Lars Lindkvist (1993), 'Transaction Costs, Clans and Corporate Culture', Journal of Management Studies, 30 (3), May, 427-52 PART IV PUBLIC POLICIES AND ORGANIZATION CHOICES 21. Mark J. Roe (2002), 'Can Culture Constrain the Economic Model of Corporate Law?', University of Chicago Law Review, 69 (3), Summer, 1251-69 22. Paul M. Hirsch (1975), 'Organizational Effectiveness and the Institutional Environment', Administrative Science Quarterly, 20 (3), September, 327-44 23. Oliver E. Williamson (1976), 'Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies - in General and with Respect to CATV', Bell Journal of Economics, 7 (1), Spring, 73-104 24. Paul L. Joskow (1991), 'The Role of Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust and Public Utility Regulatory Policies', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7, Special Issue, 53-83 343 369 385 414 471 485 513 532 550 582 25. Brian Levy and Pablo T. Spiller (1994), 'The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 10 (2), October, 201-46 Name Index 613 659