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The Foundations of the new institutional economics

Author: Ménard, Claude Series: International library of the new institutional economics ; Elgar reference collectionPublisher: Edward Elgar , 2004.Language: EnglishDescription: 526 p. : Graphs ; 25 cm.ISBN: 1843766604Type of document: BookBibliography/Index: Includes bibliographical references and index
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Book Europe Campus
Main Collection
Print HB99.5 .M46 2004
(Browse shelf)
Available 32419001209265
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Includes bibliographical references and index


The Foundations of the New Institutional Economics Contents Acknowledgements General Introduction Claude Ménard Introduction Claude Ménard ix xi xix PART I BACKGROUND 1. Bernard Mandeville ([1732] 1988), 'The Grumbling Hive: or, Knaves turn'd Honest', in The Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits, Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Classics, 17-37 3 2. Adam Smith ([1776] 1976), 'Of the Division of Labour', 'Of the Principle Which Gives Occasion to the Division of Labour' and `That the Division of Labour is Limited by the Extent of the Market', in R.H. Campbell, A.S. Skinner and W.B. Todd (eds), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Glasgow Edition, Volume I, Book I, Chapters I, II and III, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 13-24,25-30,31-6 24 PART II CLASSIC REFERENCES 3. R.H. Coase (1937), 'The Nature of the Firm', Economica, 4 (16), New Series, November, 386-405 51 4. H.B. Malmgren (1961), 'Information, Expectations and the Theory of the Firm', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 75 (3), August, 399-421 71 5. Herbert A. Simon (1962), 'The Architecture of Complexity', Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 106 (6), December, 467-82 94 6. Kenneth J. Arrow (1970), 'The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market versus Nonmarket Allocation', in Robert H. Haveman and Julius Margolis (eds), Public Expenditures and Policy Analysis, Chapter 2, Chicago, IL: Markham Publishing Company, 59-73 110 7. Lance E. Davis and Douglass C. North with the assistance of Calla Smorodin (1971), 'A Theory of Institutional Change: Concepts and Causes', in Institutional Change and American Economic Growth, Chapter 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3-25 125 8. Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972), 'Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization', American Economic Review, 62 (5), December, 777-95 148 9. Steven N.S. Cheung (1973), 'The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation', Journal of Law and Economics, XVI (1), April, 11-33 167 10. Oliver E. Williamson (1979), 'Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations', Journal of Law and Economics, XXII (2), October, 233-61 11. Leonid Hurwicz (1987), 'Inventing New Institutions: The Design Perspective', American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 69 (2), May, 395-402 PART III MODELING INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 12. Andrew Schotter (1981), 'The Nature and Function of Social Institutions', in The Economic Theory of Social Institutions, Chapter 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-17,165-6, references 13. Leonid Hurwicz (1996), 'Institutions as Families of Game Forms', Japanese Economic Review, 47 (2), June, 113-32 14. Masahiko Aoki (2000), 'Institutional Evolution as Punctuated Equilibria', in Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations: Perspectives from New Institutional Economics, Chapter 3, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, 11-33 15. David M. Kreps (1996), 'Markets and Hierarchies and (Mathematical) Economic Theory', Industrial and Corporate Change, 5 (2), 561-95 16. Michael H. Riordan and Oliver E. Williamson (1985), 'Asset Specificity and Economic Organization', International Journal of Industrial Organization, 3 (4), 365-78 17. Patrick Bajari and Steven Tadelis (2001), 'Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts', RAND Journal of Economics, 32 (3), Autumn, 387-407 18. Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast (1981), 'Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice', Public Choice, 37, 503-19 PART IV SOME MAJOR ISSUES 19. Eirik G. Furubotn and Rudolf Richter (1997), 'Introductory Observations', in Institutions and Economic Theory: The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics, Chapter 1, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1-37, references 20. James M. Buchanan (1975), 'A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory', American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 65 (2), May, 225-30 21. Elinor Ostrom (1986), 'An Agenda for the Study of Institutions', Public Choice, 48 (1), 3-25 22. Mark Granovetter (1992), 'Economic Institutions as Social Constructions: A Framework for Analysis', Acta Sociologica, 35 (1), 3-11 190 219 229 248 268 291 326 340 361 381 423 429 452 23. R.C.O. Matthews (1986), 'The Economics of Institutions and the Sources of Growth', Economic Journal, 96 (384), December, 903-18 24. Masahiko Aoki (1996), 'Towards a Comparative Institutional Analysis: Motivations and Some Tentative Theorizing', Japanese Economic Review, 47 (1), March, 1-19 461 477 25. Claude Menard (1995), 'Markets as Institutions versus Organizations as Markets? Disentangling Some Fundamental Concepts', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 28 (3), 161-82 496 26. Ronald Coase (1998), 'The New Institutional Economics', American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 88 (2), May, 72-4 518 Name Index 521

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