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Strategy: an introduction to game theory

Author: Watson, Joel Publisher: Norton 2008.Edition: 2nd ed.Language: EnglishDescription: 404 p. : Graphs ; 24 cm.ISBN: 9780393929348Type of document: BookBibliography/Index: Includes bibliographical references and index
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Includes bibliographical references and index

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Strategy An Introduction to Game Theory Contents PREFACE 1 INTRODUCTION xv 1 3 4 5 Noncooperative Game Theory Contract and Cooperative Game Theory The Meaning of "Game" PART I: REPRESENTATIONS AND BASIC ASSUMPTIONS 2 THE EXTENSIVE FORM 9 11 17 19 20 24 25 28 30 32 34 35 39 41 42 Other Examples and Conventions Guided Exercise Exercises 3 STRATEGIES AND THE NORMAL FORM Terminology and Notation for Strategies The Normal Form Classic Normal-Form Games Interpretation of the Normal Form Guided Exercise Exercises 4 BELIEFS, MIXED STRATEGIES, AND EXPECTED PAYOFFS Guided Exercise Exercises *Chapters in italics are applications chapters. 5 GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 44 45 46 46 47 Rationality Common Knowledge Overview of Solution Concepts The Issue of Realism PART II: ANALYZING BEHAVIOR IN STATIC SETTINGS 6 DOMINANCE AND BEST RESPONSE 49 51 51 54 55 56 59 62 64 67 71 72 74 77 77 80 86 87 89 91 92 96 97 100 Dominance The First Strategic Tension and the Prisoners' Dilemma The Concept of Efficiency Best Response Dominance and Best Response Compared Guided Exercise Exercises 7 RATIONALIZABILITY AND ITERATED DOMINANCE The Second Strategic Tension Guided Exercise Exercises 8 LOCATION AND PARTNERSHIP A Location Game A Partnership Game: Strategic Complementarities Guided Exercise Exercises 9 NASH EQUILIBRIUM Congruous Sets Nash Equilibrium Defined Equilibrium of the Partnership Game Coordination and Social Welfare The Third Strategic Tension Aside: Experimental Game Theory Guided Exercise Exercises 10 OLIGOPOLY, TARIFFS, CRIME, AND VOTING 100 102 103 107 107 109 111 112 112 114 117 118 123 128 128 Cournot Duopoly Model Bertrand Duopoly Model Tariff Setting by Two Countries A Model of Crime and Police The Median Voter Theorem Strategic Voting Guided Exercise Exercises 11 MIXED-STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIUM Guided Exercise Exercises 12 STRICTLY COMPETITIVE GAMES AND SECURITY STRATEGIES 134 136 137 Guided Exercise Exercises 13 CONTRACT, LAW, AND ENFORCEMENT IN STATIC SETTINGS 139 143 146 151 152 Complete Contracting in Discretionary Environments Contracting with Court-Imposed Breach Remedies Guided Exercise Exercises PART III: ANALYZING BEHAVIOR IN DYNAMIC SETTINGS 14 DETAILS OF THE EXTENSIVE FORM 157 159 164 164 Guided Exercise Exercises 15 BACKWARD INDUCTION AND SUBGAME PERFECTION 166 167 170 174 175 180 180 183 186 190 191 193 197 199 199 203 203 205 207 209 211 212 214 214 216 220 222 224 225 Sequential Rationality and Backward Induction Subgame Perfection Guided Exercise Exercises 16 TOPICS IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION Advertising and Competition A Model of Limit Capacity Dynamic Monopoly Price Guarantees as a Commitment to High Prices Guided Exercise Exercises 17 PARLOR GAMES Guided Exercise Exercises 18 BARGAINING PROBLEMS Bargaining: Value Creation and Division An Abstract Representation of Bargaining Problems An Example The Standard Bargaining Solution Guided Exercise Exercises 19 ANALYSIS OF SIMPLE BARGAINING GAMES Ultimatum Games: Power to the Proposer Two-Period, Alternating-Offer Games: Power to the Patient Infinite-Period, Alternating-Offer Game Multilateral Bargaining Guided Exercise Exercises 20 GAMES WITH JOINT DECISIONS; NEGOTIATION EQUILIBRIUM 229 230 232 233 235 237 Joint Decisions Negotiation Equilibrium Example: Contracting for High-Powered Incentives Guided Exercise Exercises 21 UNVERIFIABLE INVESTMENT, HOLD UP, OPTIONS, AND OWNERSHIP 242 243 246 249 251 253 257 258 263 266 270 271 275 275 277 278 281 282 Hold-Up Example Up-Front Contracting and Option Contracts Asset Ownership Guided Exercise Exercises 22 REPEATED GAMES AND REPUTATION A Two-Period Repeated Game An Infinitely Repeated Game The Equilibrium Payoff Set with Low Discounting Guided Exercise Exercises 23 COLLUSION, TRADE AGREEMENTS, AND GOODWILL Dynamic Oligopoly and Collusion Enforcing International Trade Agreements Goodwill and Trading a Reputation Guided Exercise Exercises PART IV: INFORMATION 24 RANDOM EVENTS AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 289 291 295 296 Guided Exercise Exercises 25 RISK AND INCENTIVES IN CONTRACTING 299 299 303 308 309 312 315 316 320 320 323 327 332 333 337 338 339 340 341 343 345 349 349 352 355 357 Risk Aversion A Principal--Agent Game Guided Exercise Exercises 26 BAYESIAN NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND RATIONALIZABILITY Guided Exercise Exercises 27 LEMONS, AUCTIONS, AND INFORMATION AGGREGATION Markets and Lemons Auctions Information Aggregation Guided Exercise Exercises 28 PERFECT BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM Conditional Beliefs about Types Sequential Rationality Consistency of Beliefs Equilibrium Definition Guided Exercise Exercises 29 JOB-MARKET SIGNALING AND REPUTATION Jobs and School Reputation and Incomplete Information Guided Exercise Exercises APPENDICES A REVIEW OF MATHEMATICS 363 365 365 Sets Functions and Calculus Probability B THE MATHEMATICS OF RATIONALIZABILITY AND EXISTENCE OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM 367 371 377 377 381 383 385 387 Dominance, Best Response, and Correlated Conjectures Rationalizability Construction Existence of Nash Equilibrium Exercises INDEX

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