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Models of political economy

Author: Nurmi, Hannu Publisher: Routledge 2006.Language: EnglishDescription: 222 p. ; 23 cm.ISBN: 0415327059Type of document: BookBibliography/Index: Includes index
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Item type Current location Collection Call number Status Date due Barcode Item holds
Book Asia Campus
Main Collection
Print HB848 .N87 2006
(Browse shelf)
Available 900179461
Total holds: 0

Includes index


Contents Models of Political Economy Models of Political Economy List of Figures Lisz of Tables Preface xi xiii xv 1 lntroduction 1.1 Suggested reading What are we aiming at? 2.1 Explaining political economy 2.2 Building theories 2.3 Models 2.4 Interpreting acts 2.5 Normative and factual models 2.6 Suggested reading Homo economicus 3.1 The role of assumptions in theory 3.2 Aspects of rationality 3.3 Making choices under certainty 3.4 Choices under risk 3.5 Choices under uncertainty 3.6 Axioms of rational behavior 3.7 Suggested reading 2 3 4 Economic man under attack 4.1 Classic paradoxes 4.2 The prospect theory 4.3 Further anomalies 4.4 Suggested reading 5 Games: descriptions and solutions 5.1 Games, game forms and strategies 5.2 Strategies and extensive form 5.3 Solutions 5.4 Subgames and trembles 5.5 Special games 5.5.1 Collective action games 5.5.2 Norms of reciprocity and coordination 5.6 Reputation makes a difference 5.7 . . . and much hinges upon the quality of information 5.8 The role of two-person game theory 5.9 Suggested reading Bargaining and coalitions 6.1 Classic solutions 6.2 Stability, core and bargaining sets 6.3 Values for n-person games 6.4 Applications to European institutions 6.5 Power and preferences 6.6 Suggested reading Decision making in committees 7.1 Basic concepts 7.2 Aggregating opinions 7.3 New systems, new winners 7.4 Theory of committee voting in the olden days 7.4.1 Borda count: two ways out 7.4.2 Problems of Borda count 7.4.3 Condorcet's paradox 7.4.4 Condorcet's solutions 7.5 Problems of Condorcet's intuition 7.6 Voting procedures 7.6.1 Procedures 7.6.2 Criteria 7.6.3 Positional methods and Condorcet criteria 7.6.4 Inconsistency of binary procedures 7.6.5 Non-monotonicity of multi-stage procedures 7.7 Choice procedures and performance criteria 7.8 Two social choice theorems 7.9 Voting as a game 7.10 Suggested reading 6 7 8 Designing for elections and public goods provision 8.1 The majority rule 8.2 Majority and plurality 8.3 Single transferable vote 8.4 Quota and divisor methods 8.5 Proportionality of what? 8.6 The general design problem 8.7 Optimizing the public goods provision 8.8 Suggested reading What kind of government? 9.1 States as bandits 9.2 A just state 9.3 Redistribution and rent seeking 9.4 Suggested reading 9 10 Aspects of policy evaluation 10.1 Deciding the number of criteria 1 0.2 Majorities, positions, weights 10.3 Changes in alternative sets 10.4 Close and yet so far 10.5 One more criterion cannot do any harm, can it? 10.6 Forest and the trees 10.7 Voters are much the same as criteria 10.8 Suggested reading 11 H o m o axonomicus: should we let him go? Notes Bibliography Name Index Subject Index

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