Normal view MARC view

Designing economic mechanisms

Author: Hurwicz, Leonid ; Reiter, StanleyPublisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP) 2006.Language: EnglishDescription: 344 p. ; 23 cm.ISBN: 0521836417Type of document: BookBibliography/Index: Includes bibliographical references and index
Tags: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.
Item type Current location Collection Call number Status Date due Barcode Item holds
Book Europe Campus
Main Collection
Print HB135 .H87 2006
(Browse shelf)
001214885
Available 001214885
Total holds: 0

Includes bibliographical references and index

Digitized

Designing Economic Mechanisms Contents Acknowledgements Introduction 1 Mechanisms and Mechanism Design 1.0 Introduction 1.1 Mechanisms and Design 1.2 Environments and Goal Functions 1.3 Mechanisms: Message Exchange Processes and Game Forms 1.4 Initial Dispersion of Information and Privacy Preservation 1.5 Mechanism Design 1.6 Mechanism Design Illustrated in a Walrasian Example 1.6.1 An Edgeworth Box Economy 1.6.2 The Walrasian Goal Function 1.6.3 Mechanisms: The Competitive Mechanism 1.6.4 Competitive Equilibrium Conditions 1.6.5 The Competitive Mechanism Is a Mechanism 1.6.6 The Competitive Mechanism Illustrates Some Concepts Used in Mechanism Design 1.6.7 Privacy Preservation in the Competitive Mechanism 1.6.8 Deriving a Mechanism (Not the Competitive Mechanism) from a Covering for the Walrasian Goal Function 1.6.9 Informational Properties of the Two Mechanisms 1.6.10 The Rectangles Method Applied to the Walrasian Goal Function -- Informal page ix 1 14 14 18 25 26 29 30 31 31 32 35 35 36 37 38 40 42 44 1.7 Introductory Discussion of Informational Efficiency Concepts 1.8 A National Forest 2 From Goals to Means: Constructing Mechanisms 2.1 Phase One: Mechanism Construction 2.1.1 Two Examples 2.1.2 Constructing a "Universal" Method of Designing Informationally Efficient Mechanisms Realizing a Given Goal Function 2.1.3 The Method of Rectangles (RM) 2.2 Phase 2: Constructing Decentralized Mechanisms, from Parameter Indexed Product Structures: Transition to Message-Indexed Product Structures 2.2.0 Introduction 2.2.1 Basic Concepts 2.2.2 The L-dot Example 2.2.3 More Examples 2.2.4 General Issues in Mechanism Construction 2.2.5 Mechanism Construction for L-dot 2.3 Smooth Transversal Construction for Partitions by the "Flagpole" Method 2.3.1 Flagpoles: General Principles 2.3.2 Flagpoles: Example 2 (Augmented Inner Product) 2.3.3 Flagpoles: A Walrasian Example 2.3.4 Unique Solvability Implies Partition 2.4 Analytic Aspects 2.4.1 Phase Two via Condensation. General Principles 2.4.2 The Mount­Reiter Condensation Theorem (Sufficiency) 2.4.3 Walrasian Mechanism Construction 2.4.4 Phase Two of Mechanism Design via Condensation for the Augmented Two-Dimensional Inner Product 2.5 Overlaps 2.5.0 Constructing a Mechanism When the Parameter-Indexed Product Structure Is Not a Partition: An Example Appendix 2.6 Informational Efficiency 2.6.1 Main Results 2.6.2 The Maximality of Reflexive RM-Coverings 2.6.3 Informational Efficiency: General Considerations 46 50 63 74 74 83 86 101 101 102 104 105 109 114 117 117 120 125 129 130 131 136 140 149 154 154 163 165 165 166 168 2.6.4 A Comment on Informational Efficiency Concepts 2.6.5 Minimal Informational Size Is Achievable by an rRM Mechanism 2.6.6 Two rRM Coverings of Different Informational Size for the Same Goal Function: An Example Appendix 3 Designing Informationally Efficient Mechanisms Using the Language of Sets 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Mechanism Design 3.2.1 Decentralization 3.3 Mechanisms and Coverings 3.4 A Systematic Process for Constructing an rRM Covering 3.4.1 OrRM: An Algorithm for Constructing an rRM Covering of a Finite Parameter Space That Is Minimal in the Class of Rectangular, F-Contour Contained Coverings 3.5 Constructing a Mechanism from a Covering by the Transversals Method (TM) 3.6 Coverings and Partitions 3.7 Informational Efficiency 3.7.1 Introduction 3.7.2 Observational Efficiency 3.7.3 The Maximality of rRM-Coverings 3.7.4 Informational Size and Coarseness 3.8 Section 1.8 Revisited: A Graphical Presentation 3.9 Strategic Behavior 3.9.1 Dominant Strategy Implementation 3.9.2 Designing Informationally Efficient Nash-Implementing Mechanisms Appendix: Characterizations of Partitions 4 Revelation Mechanisms 4.1 Introduction 4.1.1 Computational Complexity of Functions 4.1.2 Separator Sets and Quotients 4.1.3 Algebraic Conditions 4.1.4 Privacy-Preserving Mechanisms 4.2 Initial Set-Theoretic Constructions 4.2.1 Encoded and Essential Revelation Mechanisms 4.2.2 F-Equivalence and Encoded Revelation Mechanisms 171 172 175 180 182 182 183 184 186 188 197 220 230 244 244 245 246 250 263 274 274 279 290 296 296 299 303 306 307 310 310 310 4.3 The Topological Case 4.3.1 Differential Separability 4.3.2 The Number of Variables on which F Really Depends 4.3.3 Rank Conditions and Construction of an Essential Revelation Mechanism for F 4.4 Proofs and Examples 4.4.1 Leontief and Abelson Theorem 4.4.2 Leontief's Theorem 4.4.3 An Example of the Coordinate Construction 4.4.4 Proof of Theorem 4.4.6 References Index 313 315 316 317 322 322 324 329 331 335 341

There are no comments for this item.

Log in to your account to post a comment.
Koha 18.11 - INSEAD Catalogue
Home | Contact Us | What's Koha?