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Rationality and dynamic choice: foundational explorations

Author: McClennen, Edward F. Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP) 1990.Language: EnglishDescription: 311 p. : Graphs ; 23 cm.ISBN: 0521360471Type of document: BookBibliography/Index: Includes bibliographical references and index
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Item type Current location Collection Call number Status Date due Barcode Item holds
Book Europe Campus
Main Collection
Print BF441 .M33 1990
(Browse shelf)
32419001208739
Available 32419001208739
Total holds: 0

Includes bibliographical references and index

Digitized

Rationality and Dynamic Choice Foundational Explorations Contents Conditions on orderings and acceptable-set functions Acknowledgments 1 Introduction and sketch of the main argument 1.1 Two principles of rationality 1.2 The focus of the book 1.3 The problem of justification 1.4 An alternative approach to justification 1.5 Hammond's consequentialist argument 1.6 Pragmatism and dynamic choice 1.7 Do the pragmatic arguments succeed? 1.8 Resolute choice 1.9 The issue of feasibility 1.10 Other implications of resolute choice 1.11 The organization of the book 2 The ordering principle 2.1 Weak preference orderings 2.2 Preference and choice 2.3 Choice functions and coherence 2.4 Weak orderings and choice functions 2.5 The minimax risk rule 2.6 Reinterpreting the standard results 2.7 General preference-based choice functions 2.8 Necessary conditions on choice functions 2.9 Another generalization 2.10 A maximally permissive framework 2.11 A more structured framework 2.12 Summary 3 The independence principle 3.1 Alternative formulations of independence 3.2 Reduction principles 3.3 Independence and noncomplementarity 3.4 Independence and sure-thing reasoning 3.5 Independence and dominance page xi xv 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 11 12 14 15 17 20 20 21 22 24 25 28 33 34 35 36 40 41 44 44 46 47 48 50 3.6 Stochastic dominance 3.7 A choice-set version of independence 3.8 The expected utility result 4 The problem of justification 4.1 Introduction 4.2 The reduction assumption 4.3 The weak ordering condition 4.4 The transitivity condition 4.5 Disjunctive noncomplementarity 4.6 The independence principle 4.7 Sure-thing reasoning and independence 4.8 Summary 5 Pragmatic arguments 5.1 Introduction 5.2 A pragmatic/consequentialist perspective 5.3 Refining the pragmatic perspective 5.4 Money-pump arguments 5.5 Violations of IND and DSO 5.6 Dutch books 5.7 Summary 6 Dynamic choice problems 6.1 Dynamic choice and decision trees 6.2 Trees and terminal outcomes 6.3 Plans 6.4 Truncated trees and plans 6.5 The evaluation of plans 6.6 Evaluation at subsequent nodes 6.7 Prospects 6.8 An important qualification 7 Rationality conditions on dynamic choice 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Simple reduction 7.3 Plan reduction conditions 7.4 Dynamic consistency 7.5 Separability 7.6 Summary of dynamic choice conditions 7.7 The relation between SR, NEC, DC, and SEP 8 Consequentialist constructions 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Derivation of the context-free principle 53 57 58 60 60 62 64 65 67 73 77 80 82 82 84 86 89 91 95 96 99 99 100 100 101 101 104 107 111 112 112 113 113 116 120 122 123 127 127 129 8.3 Derivation of the independence principle 8.4 Plausibility of the construction 8.5 Formalizing restricted feasibility 8.6 Theorems for separable feasibility 8.7 Results for very separable feasibility 8.8 Modifying the separability assumption 8.9 Implications for Hammond's construction 8.10 An additional problem 8.11 A return to a more pragmatic perspective 9 Reinterpreting dynamic consistency 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Strotz on dynamic inconsistency 9.3 An interpretive problem 9.4 Sophisticated choice 9.5 Sophisticated choice and plan reduction 9.6 Resolute choice 9.7 Resolute choice and separability 9.8 Resolute choice and feasibility 9.9 Summary and anticipations 10 A critique of the pragmatic arguments 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Context-free conditions and money pumps 10.3 Independence violations 10.4 Raiffa's argument 10.5 Seidenfeld's argument 10.6 Some tentative conclusions 11 Formalizing a pragmatic perspective 11.1 Introduction 11.2 The problem with myopic choice 11.3 The problem with sophisticated choice 11.4 Significance of the pragmatic arguments 11.5 Pragmatic impeccability of resolute choice 11.6 Conclusions and anticipations 12 The feasibility of resolute choice 12.1 An argument against resolute choice 12.2 Different senses of feasibility 12.3 Dynamic choice and R-feasibility 12.4 Resolute choice and separability 12.5 A closer look at separability 12.6 Consequentialism and resolute choice 131 132 134 137 139 141 142 143 146 148 148 148 152 153 154 156 158 159 160 162 162 163 167 168 173 182 183 183 184 190 195 198 198 200 200 200 203 204 206 209 12.7 Endogenous preference changes 12.8 Another condition of R-feasibility? 12.9 Presuppositions concerning the self 13 Connections 13.1 Other models of dynamic choice 13.2 Strotz's article and related literature 13.3 Johnsen and Donaldson 13.4 Schelling 13.5 Thaler and Shefrin 13.6 Bratman 13.7 Elster 14 Conclusions 14.1 The standard theory of rationality 14.2 A possible fallback position 14.3 Consequentialist choice 14.4 Symmetry of the arguments presented 14.5 The issue of choice versus preference 14.6 Final remarks about dominance arguments 14.7 The demand for a determinate theory 15 Postscript: projections 15.1 Resolute choice and game theory 15.2 Resolute choice and morality Notes Bibliography Author index Subject index 213 215 216 219 219 219 223 225 225 226 231 239 239 241 242 243 244 246 251 256 256 261 265 300 307 309

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