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Personnel economics

Author: Lazear, Edward P. ; McNabb, Robert Series: International library of critical writings in economics ; 171 Publisher: Edward Elgar , 2004.Language: EnglishDescription: 25 cm.ISBN: 1840648929Type of document: BookBibliography/Index: Includes bibliographical references and indexContents Note: Vol.1: Concepts, 655 p.; Vol.2: Performance, 332 p.
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900210065
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Print HD6957 .P47 2004 Vol. 1
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Print HD6957 .P47 2004 Vol. 2
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Print HD6957 .P47 2004 Vol. 1
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Includes bibliographical references and index

Vol.1: Concepts, 655 p.; Vol.2: Performance, 332 p.

Digitized

Personnel Economics Concepts Volume I Contents Acknowledgements Introduction Edward P. Lazear and Robert McNabb PART I THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS A Basics 1. Gary S. Becker (1962), 'Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis', Journal of Political Economy, 70 (5, Part 2), October, 9-49 2. Stephen A. Ross (1973), 'The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem', American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 63 (2), May, 134-9 3. Joseph E. Stiglitz (1975), 'Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy', Bell Journal of Economics, 6 (2), Autumn, 552-79 4. Edward P. Lazear (1979), 'Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?', Journal of Political Economy, 87 (6), 1261-84 5. Bengt Holmstrom (1979), 'Moral Hazard and Observability', Bell Journal of Economics, 10 (1), Spring, 74-91 6. Eugene F. Fama (1980), 'Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm', Journal of Political Economy, 88 (2), April, 288-307 7. Assar Lindbeck and Dennis J. Snower (1986), 'Wage Setting, Unemployment, and Insider-Outsider Relations', American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 76 (2), May, 235-9 B Tournaments 8. Edward P. Lazear and Sherwin Rosen (1981), 'Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts', Journal of Political Economy, 89 (5), October, 841-64 9. Sherwin Rosen (1986), 'Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments', American Economic Review, 76 (4), September, 701-15 10. Edward P. Lazear (1989), Tay Equality and Industrial Politics', Journal of Political Economy, 97 (3), 561-80 C Measurement 11. Edward P. Lazear (1986), 'Salaries and Piece Rates', Journal of Business, 59 (3), July, 405-31 ix xi 5 46 52 80 104 122 142 149 173 188 211 12. George P. Baker (1992), 'Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement', Journal of Political Economy, 100 (3), June, 598-614 238 13. Margaret A. Meyer (1994), 'The Dynamics of Learning with Team Production: Implications for Task Assignment', Quarterly Journal of Economics, CIX, November, 1157-84 255 PART II THEORETICAL ISSUES: PUZZLES, ANALYSIS AND ANSWERS 14. H. Lorne Carmichael (1988), 'Incentives in Academics: Why Is There Tenure?', Journal of Political Economy, 96 (3), June, 453-72 285 15. Charles Kahn and Gur Huberman (1988), 'Two-sided Uncertainty and "Up-or-Out" Contracts', Journal of Labor Economics, 6 (4), October, 423-44 305 16. Eugene Kandel and Edward P. Lazear (1992), 'Peer Pressure and Partnerships', Journal of Political Economy, 100 (4), August, 801-17 327 17. Canice J. Prendergast (1995), 'A Theory of Responsibility in Organizations', Journal of Labor Economics, 13 (3), July, 387-400 344 18. Sherwin Rosen (1992), 'The Military as an Internal Labor Market: Some Allocation, Productivity, and Incentive Problems', Social Science Quarterly, 73 (2), June, 227-37 358 PART III THE JOB 19. Edward P. Lazear (1992), 'The Job as a Concept', in William J. Bruns, Jr. (ed.), Performance Measurement, Evaluation, and Incentives, Chapter 7, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 183-215 371 20. George Baker, Michael Gibbs and Bengt Holmstrom (1994), 'The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data', Quarterly Journal of Economics, CIX, November, 881-919 404 21. Michael L. Wachter and Randall D. Wright (1990), 'The Economics of Internal Labor Markets', Industrial Relations, 29 (2), Spring, 240-62 443 22. Robert Gibbons and Michael Waldman (1999), 'A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms', Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXIV (4), November, 1321-58 468 23. Oliver E. Williamson, Michael"­ Wachter and Jeffrey E. Harris (1975), ' Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange', Bell Journal of Economics, 6 (1), Spring, 250-78 506 PART IV PERSONNEL STRATEGY 24. Casey Ichniowski, Kathryn Shaw and Giovanna Prennushi (1997), `The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines', American Economic Review, 87 (3), June, 291-313 537 25. Richard B. Freeman and Edward P. Lazear (1995), 'An Economic Analysis of Works Councils', in Joel Rogers and Wolfgang Streeck (eds), Works Councils: Consultation, Representation, and Cooperation in Industrial Relations, Chapter 2, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 27-50 26. Julio J. Rotemberg (1994), 'Human Relations in the Workplace', Journal of Political Economy, 102 (4), August, 684-717 27. Raaj Kumar Sah and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1986), 'The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies', American Economic Review, 76 (4), September, 716-27 28. Renee M. Landers, James B. Rebitzer and Lowell J. Taylor (1996), `Rat Race Redux: Adverse Selection in the Determination of Work Hours in Law Firms', American Economic Review, 86 (3), June, 329-48 Name Index 560 584 618 630 651 Personnel Economics Performance Volume II Contents Acknowledgements An introduction by the editors to both volumes appears in Volume I PART I PIECE RATE PAY 1. Edward P Lazear (2000), 'Performance Pay and Productivity', American Economic Review, 90 (5), December, 1346-61 2. Beth J. Asch (1990), `Do Incentives Matter? The Case of Navy Recruiters', Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43, Special Issue, February, 89S-106S 3. Sue Fernie and David Metcalf (1999), 'It's Not What You Pay it's the Way that You Pay it and that's What Gets Results: Jockeys' Pay and Performance', Labour, 13 (2), June, 385-411 4. Charles Brown (1990), 'Firms' Choice of Method of Pay', Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43, Special Issue, February, 165S-182S PART II PROFIT SHARING AND TOURNAMENT PAY STRUCTURES, OTHER INCENTIVE SCHEMES 5. Robert Drago and Gerald T. Garvey (1998), 'Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence', Journal of Labor Economics, 16 (1), January, 1-25 6. Tor Eriksson (1999), 'Executive Compensation and Tournament Theory: Empirical Tests on Danish Data', Journal of Labor Economics, 17 (2), April, 262-80 7. Charles R. Knoeber and Walter N. Thurman (1994), 'Testing the Theory of Tournaments: An Empirical Analysis of Broiler Production', Journal of Labor Economics, 12 (2), April, 155-79 8. Daniel M.G. Raff and Lawrence H. Summers (1987), 'Did Henry Ford Pay Efficiency Wages?', Journal of Labor Economics, 5 (4, Part 2), October, S57--S86 9. Jonathan S. Leonard (1987), 'Carrots and Sticks: Pay, Supervision, and Turnover', Journal of Labor Economics, 5 (4), Part 2, October, S136--S152 10. David G. Blanchflower and Andrew J. Oswald (1988), 'Profit-Related Pay: Prose Discovered?', Economic Journal, 98 (392), September, 720-30 11. Robert McNabb and Keith Whitfield (1998), 'The Impact of Financial Participation and Employee Involvement on Financial Performance', Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 45 (2), May, 171-87 vii 3 19 37 64 85 110 129 154 184 201 212 PART III EXECUTIVE COMPENSATIONS 12. Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy (1990), 'Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives', Journal of Political Economy, 98 (2), April, 225-64 13. Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (1990), 'Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers', Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43, Special Issue, February, 30S-51S 14. Brian G.M. Main, Alistair Bruce and Trevor Buck (1996), 'Total Board Remuneration and Company Performance', Economic Journal, 106, November, 1627-44 15. Jonathan S. Leonard (1990), 'Executive Pay and Firm Performance', Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43, Special Issue, February, 13S-29S Name Index 231 271 293 311 329

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