On the existence of an increasing symmetric equilibrium in (k + 1)-st price common value auctions
Author: Tsetlin, Ilia ; Pekec, SasaINSEAD Area: Decision SciencesIn: Review of Economic Design, vol. 10, no. 1, 2006 Language: EnglishDescription: p. 63-71.Type of document: INSEAD ArticleNote: Please ask us for this itemAbstract: A classic result of Milgrom (1981) establishes that the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP) of a signal distribution is a sufficient condition for the existence of symmetric equilibria in common value uniform price (set at the value of the highest rejected bid) multi-item unit-demand auctions. We show that symmetric equilibria could exist even when MLRP is violated and show that a necessary condition is a weakened localized version of MLRP.| Item type | Current location | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds |
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Europe Campus | Available | BC007896 |
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A classic result of Milgrom (1981) establishes that the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP) of a signal distribution is a sufficient condition for the existence of symmetric equilibria in common value uniform price (set at the value of the highest rejected bid) multi-item unit-demand auctions. We show that symmetric equilibria could exist even when MLRP is violated and show that a necessary condition is a weakened localized version of MLRP.
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