Normal view MARC view

Industrial organization: a European perspective

Author: Martin, Stephen Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP) 2001.Language: EnglishDescription: 254 p. : Graphs ; 25 cm.ISBN: 0198297289Type of document: BookBibliography/Index: Includes bibliographical references and index
Tags: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.
Item type Current location Collection Call number Status Date due Barcode Item holds
Book Europe Campus
Main Collection
Print HD2326.6 .M37 2001
(Browse shelf)
001212806
Available 001212806
Total holds: 0

Includes bibliographical references and index

Digitized

Industrial Organization A European Perspective Contents Preface 1 Background 1.1 Subject matter 1 .2 Markets and market structure 1.2.1 Industry classification schemes 1.2.2 Measures of supply-side market structure 1.3 Perfect competition and monopoly 1.3.1 Perfect competition 1.3.2 Monopoly 1.4 EC competition policy Study points Problems xv 1 1 3 5 6 10 10 17 20 21 22 2 Oligopoly markets: noncooperative behaviour 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Cournot oligopoly 2.2.1 The basic model 2.2.2 Best response functions 2.2.3 Cournot equilibrium 2.2.4 Taxes 2.2.5 Cost differences 2.2.6 Conjectural variations 2.2.7 Product differentiation 2.2.8 Consumer switching costs 2.2.9 Sales maximization 2.2.10 Many firms 2.3 Bertrand duopoly 2.3.1 Standardized product 2.3.2 Differentiated products 2.4 Summary Study points Problems 23 23 23 23 24 26 29 32 34 37 37 40 41 43 43 45 47 47 48 3 Collusion and tacit collusion 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Noncooperative collusion 3.2.1 Trigger strategy 49 49 50 50 Vi CONTENTS 3.2.2 Basing point pricing 3.2.3 Publicity 3.3 Welfare consequences of collusion 3.4 Article 81 3.4.1 Provisions 3.4.2 Applications 3.5 Enforcement 3.5.1 Leniency 3.5.2 Cooperation 3.5.3 Direct applicability 3.6 Market definition for the application of competition policy 3.7 Summary Study points Problems 53 55 57 59 59 59 65 65 65 65 67 68 69 69 4 Dominance 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Quantity leadership 4.3 Limit pricing 4.3.1 Entry deterrence with output commitment 4.3.2 Entry deterrence with imperfectly informed entrants 70 70 70 73 73 76 79 82 4.4 Predation and the chain store paradox 4.5 Article 82 4.5.1 Price discrimination 4.5.2 Loyalty rebates 4.5.3 Public monopolies 4.6 Summary Study points Problems 83 85 86 87 87 88 5 Innovation 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Innovation in a market system 5.2.1 Spillovers 5.2.2 Uncertainty 5.3 The rates of return to RandD 89 89 90 90 91 91 93 93 94 96 5.4 Market structure and innovation 5.4.1 Schumpeter 5.4.2 Arrow 5.5 Appropriability and absorptive capacity CONTENTS Vii 5.6 Promoting RandD 5.6.1 RandD cooperation in practice 5.6.2 RandD cooperation in theory 5.7 Innovation and EU competition policy 5.7.1 Cooperative RandD under Article 81 5.7.2 Intellectual property rights and Article 82 5.8 S u m m a r y Study points 98 98 100 101 101 102 104 105 6 Organization 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Market structure 6.2.1 Cournot oligopoly, single-plant firms 6.2.2 Conjectural variations, single-plant firms 6.2.3 Cournot oligopoly, multiplant firms 6.3 Entry and exit 106 106 107 107 111 111 113 115 6.4 Seller concentration and the size distribution of firms 6.4.1 Gibrat's Law 6.4.2 Seller concentration and endogenous sunk costs 6.5 Network externalities 6.5.1 Market structure and market performance with network externalities 6.5.2 Path dependence 6.6 Firms and firm structure 6.6.1 Coase 6.6.2 Transaction costs 6.6.3 Property rights 6.6.4 Chandler 6.6.5 Reprise 6.7 Merger policy 6.7.1 Merger control regulation 6.7.2 Joint ventures and joint dominance 6.8 Cooperation 6.9 S u m m a r y Study points Problems 115 117 119 121 121 122 123 124 125 125 128 128 129 132 133 136 136 137 7 Imperfect competition and international trade: I 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Interindustry trade 7.2.1 Comparative advantage 7.2.2 Factor mobility and immobility 140 140 142 142 143 Viii CONTENTS 7.2.3 Factor endowments and the Leontief paradox 7.3 Intraindustry trade 7.3.1 Quantity-setting firms 7.3.2 Price-setting firms 7.4 Trade and domestic market performance 7.5 Summary Study points Problems 144 148 148 153 156 157 157 157 8 Imperfect competition and international trade: II 8.1 Trade policy 8.1.1 Strategic trade policy 8.1.2 Tariffs and quotas 8.1.3 Import barriers and export-promotion 159 159 159 166 168 169 173 174 176 176 177 177 179 180 181 181 181 8.2 Exchange rate passthrough 8.3 Trade and market structure 8.3.1 Mode of supply to a foreign market 8.3.2 Mutual forbearance 8.3.3 Exporting 8.3.4 Licensing/joint venture 8.3.5 Direct foreign investment 8.3.6 Exports v. DFL: substitutes or complements? 8.3.7 Hysteresis 8.4 Summary Study points Problems 9 Trade policy and competition policy 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Export cartels 9.2.1 Theory 9.2.2 Practice 9.3 Voluntary export restraints 9.3.1 Quality upgrading 9.3.2 Trade diversion 9.3.3 Welfare consequences 9.3.4 VERs and the WTO Agreements 9.4 Dumping 9.4.1 Dumping as price discrimination: reciprocal dumping 9.4.2 Dumping as predation 9.4.3 Antidumping policy: theory 9.4.4 EC antidumping policy: application 185 185 185 186 189 194 196 196 197 197 198 199 202 202 204 CONTENTS IX 9.5 What is to be done? S t u d y points Problems 207 208 209 10 Market integration in the European Union 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Market integration in theory 10.2.1 Market integration and market performance 10.2.2 Imperfect competition 10.2.3 Market integration and market structure 10.3 Market integration in practice 10.3.1 Prologue: the ECSC 10.3.2 Market integration: empirical evidence 10.4 State aid and state aid policy 10.4.1 The extent of state aid 10.4.2 Economic analysis of state aid 10.4.3 The application of state aid policy 10.5 Summary S t u d y points Problems 211 211 212 212 214 217 219 219 222 226 226 229 232 234 234 234 References Index of Commission Decisions Index of Court Decisions Index of Names Index of Subjects 236 247 247 248 251

There are no comments for this item.

Log in to your account to post a comment.
Koha 18.11 - INSEAD Catalogue
Home | Contact Us | What's Koha?