Normal view MARC view

Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy

Author: Acemoglu, Daron ; Robinson, James A.Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP) 2006.Language: EnglishDescription: 416 p. ; 24 cm.ISBN: 0521855268Type of document: BookBibliography/Index: Includes bibliographical references and index
Tags: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.
Item type Current location Collection Call number Status Date due Barcode Item holds
Book Europe Campus
Main Collection
Print JA70 .E36 A34 2006
(Browse shelf)
001175342
Available 001175342
Total holds: 0

Includes bibliographical references and index

Digitized

Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy Contents Preface PART ONE. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS page xi 1. Paths of Political Development 1 2 5 8 1. Britain 2. Argentina 3. Singapore 4. South Africa 5. The Agenda 2. Our Argument 10 14 15 16 1. Democracy versus Nondemocracy 2. Building Blocks of Our Approach 3. Toward Our Basic Story 4. Our Theory of Democratization 5. Democratic Consolidation 6. Determinants of Democracy 7. Political Identities and the Nature of Conflict 8. Democracy in a Picture 9. Overview of the Book 3. What Do We Know about Democracy? 19 22 23 30 31 42 43 46 48 48 51 58 65 65 75 80 1. Measuring Democracy 2. Patterns of Democracy 3. Democracy, Inequality, and Redistribution 4. Crises and Democracy 5. Social Unrest and Democratization 6. The Literature 7. Our Contribution viii Contents PART TWO. MODELING POLITICS 4. Democratic Politics 89 89 91 92 99 113 117 118 118 120 128 133 144 151 161 171 1. Introduction 2. Aggregating Individual Preferences 3. Single-Peaked Preferences and the Median Voter Theorem 4. Our Workhorse Models 5. Democracy and Political Equality 6. Conclusion 5. Nondemocratic Politics 1. Introduction 2. Power and Constraints in Nondemocratic Politics 3. Modeling Preferences and Constraints in Nondemocracies 4. Commitment Problems 5. A Simple Game of Promises 6. A Dynamic Model 7. Incentive-Compatible Promises 8. Conclusion PART THREE. THE CREATION AND CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY 6. Democratization 173 173 173 176 177 181 186 193 201 203 207 207 211 214 215 218 221 221 224 225 231 246 246 1. Introduction 2. The Role of Political Institutions 3. Preferences over Political Institutions 4. Political Power and Institutions 5. A Static Model of Democratization 6. Democratization or Repression? 7. A Dynamic Model of Democratization 8. Subgame Perfect Equilibria 9. Alternative Political Identities 10. Targeted Transfers 11. Power of the Elites in Democracy 12. Ideological Preferences over Regimes 13. Democratization in a Picture 14. Equilibrium Revolutions 15. Conclusion 7. Coups and Consolidation 1. Introduction 2. Incentives for Coups 3. A Static Model of Coups 4. A Dynamic Model of the Creation and Consolidation of Democracy 5. Alternative Political Identities 6. Targeted Transfers Contents ix 247 249 251 253 7. Power in Democracy and Coups 8. Consolidation in a Picture 9. Defensive Coups 10. Conclusion PART FOUR. PUTTING THE MODELS TO WORK 8. The Role of the Middle Class 1. 2. 3. 255 255 259 262 267 273 278 283 285 287 287 290 292 293 296 300 307 312 313 316 317 319 321 321 325 331 334 338 343 344 347 Introduction The Three-Class Model Emergence of Partial Democracy 4. From Partial to Full Democracy 5. Repression: The Middle Class as a Buffer 6. Repression: Softliners versus Hardliners 7. The Role of the Middle Class in Consolidating Democracy 8. Conclusion 9. Economic Structure and Democracy 1. Introduction 2. Economic Structure and Income Distribution 3. Political Conflict 4. Capital, Land, and the Transition to Democracy 5. Costs of Coup on Capital and Land 6. Capital, Land, and the Burden of Democracy 7. Conflict between Landowners and Industrialists 8. Industrialists, Landowners, and Democracy in Practice 9. Economic Institutions 10. Human Capital 11. Conjectures about Political Development 12. Conclusion 10. Globalization and Democracy 1. Introduction 2. A Model of an Open Economy 3. Political Conflict - Democratic Consolidation 4. Political Conflict - Transition to Democracy 5. Financial Integration 6. Increased Political Integration 7. Alternative Assumptions about the Nature of International Trade 8. Conclusion PART FIVE. CONCLUSIONS AND THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY 11. Conclusions and the Future of Democracy 349 349 355 358 1. Paths of Political Development Revisited 2. Extensions and Areas for Future Research 3. The Future of Democracy x Contents PART SIX. APPENDIX 12. Appendix to Chapter 4: The Distribution of Power in Democracy 1. Introduction 2. Probabilistic Voting Models 3. Lobbying 4. Partisan Politics and Political Capture Bibliography Index 361 361 361 367 373 381 401

There are no comments for this item.

Log in to your account to post a comment.
Koha 18.11 - INSEAD Catalogue
Home | Contact Us | What's Koha?