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Competing in groups

Author: Shipilov, Andrew ; Rowley, T. ; Baum, Joel A. C.INSEAD Area: StrategyIn: Managerial and Decision Economics, vol. 25, no 6-7, September/November 2004 Language: EnglishDescription: p. 453-471.Type of document: INSEAD ArticleNote: Please ask us for this itemAbstract: In this study, we examine how the characteristics of clique structures affect the performance of firms embedded within the cliques. Although it is generally accepted in organization theory and strategic management that firms are embedded within ego and overarching industry networks that each affect their behavior and performance, there is little evidence on whether cliques are stable features of industry networks or affect firm behavior or performance. We theorize that the value of a clique to its members depends on (1) the network centrality of the clique and (2) the internal structure and organization (heterogeneity and inequality) of the clique. Our analysis of the Canadian investment banking industry from 1952 to 1990 provides empirical evidence of stable cliques, and indicates that while a clique's internal structure and organization materially affect firm-level benefits of clique membership, its positional embeddedness within the industry network does not.
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In this study, we examine how the characteristics of clique structures affect the performance of firms embedded within the cliques. Although it is generally accepted in organization theory and strategic management that firms are embedded within ego and overarching industry networks that each affect their behavior and performance, there is little evidence on whether cliques are stable features of industry networks or affect firm behavior or performance. We theorize that the value of a clique to its members depends on (1) the network centrality of the clique and (2) the internal structure and organization (heterogeneity and inequality) of the clique. Our analysis of the Canadian investment banking industry from 1952 to 1990 provides empirical evidence of stable cliques, and indicates that while a clique's internal structure and organization materially affect firm-level benefits of clique membership, its positional embeddedness within the industry network does not.

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