On timing of adoption of multiproduct technologies
Author: Röller, Lars-Hendrik ; Kim, Taekwon ; Tombak, Mihkel MINSEAD Area: Economics and Political ScienceIn: Naval Research Logistics, vol. 41, no. 3, 1994 Language: EnglishDescription: p. 377-394.Type of document: INSEAD ArticleNote: Please ask us for this itemAbstract: This paper examines a game of multiproduct technology adoption. We consider a duopoly model in which firms choose when to switch from a traditional single product technology to a more flexible and more expensive multiproduct technology. The multiproduct technology allows a firm to invade the other firm's market, creating a more competitive environment and reducing profits. We analyze this investment decision as a game of timing using two different equilibrium comcepts. First, we utilize the "silent" equilibrium concept, where firms commit at time zero to a switching time. The second concept used is that of "noisy" equilibrium, where firms cannot precommit themselves to an adoption time| Item type | Current location | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds |
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This paper examines a game of multiproduct technology adoption. We consider a duopoly model in which firms choose when to switch from a traditional single product technology to a more flexible and more expensive multiproduct technology. The multiproduct technology allows a firm to invade the other firm's market, creating a more competitive environment and reducing profits. We analyze this investment decision as a game of timing using two different equilibrium comcepts. First, we utilize the "silent" equilibrium concept, where firms commit at time zero to a switching time. The second concept used is that of "noisy" equilibrium, where firms cannot precommit themselves to an adoption time
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