Prudence and success in politics
Author: Cadot, Olivier ; Sinclair-Desgagné, BernardINSEAD Area: Economics and Political Science ; Technology and Operations ManagementIn: Economics and Politics, vol. 4, 1992 Language: EnglishDescription: p. 171-189.Type of document: INSEAD ArticleNote: Please ask us for this itemAbstract: This paper considers a repeated election game between an infinitely-lived representative voter and finitely-lived, heterogeneous politicians. The voter's prior belief about the incumbent's competency is updated during the incumbent's first term in office. The voter's problem is to find a rule that simultaneously selects and controls politicians. We show that the simple performance rule, standard in literature, is justified as a time-consistent rule for a forward-looking voter. The outcome of a large class of perfect equilibria is "strategic caution": incumbent politicians slow down the voter's Bayesian learning by taking only weakly informative actions| Item type | Current location | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Europe Campus | Available | BC003805 |
Ask Qualtrics
This paper considers a repeated election game between an infinitely-lived representative voter and finitely-lived, heterogeneous politicians. The voter's prior belief about the incumbent's competency is updated during the incumbent's first term in office. The voter's problem is to find a rule that simultaneously selects and controls politicians. We show that the simple performance rule, standard in literature, is justified as a time-consistent rule for a forward-looking voter. The outcome of a large class of perfect equilibria is "strategic caution": incumbent politicians slow down the voter's Bayesian learning by taking only weakly informative actions
Digitized
There are no comments for this item.