Information disclosure, means of payment and takeover premia: public and private tender offers in France
Author: Langohr, Herwig ; Eckbo, B. EspenINSEAD Area: FinanceIn: Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 24, no. 2, October 1989 Language: EnglishDescription: p. 363-403.Type of document: INSEAD ArticleNote: Please ask us for this itemAbstract: This paper presents evidence that the introduction of disclosure regulations governing public tenders offers in France caused an immediate and significant increase in interfirm cash tender offer premia. Private tender offers are exempted from the disclosure regulations, and offer premia are significanty lower in private than in public cash tender offers for voting-control. Furthermore, it is found that offer premia are significantly higher in all-cash than in all-stock offers, whether the bid is for voting-control or a minority buyout. The higher cash-premium, which is not explained by taxes or regulations, is consistent with an information-signalling effect of the means of payment| Item type | Current location | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds |
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This paper presents evidence that the introduction of disclosure regulations governing public tenders offers in France caused an immediate and significant increase in interfirm cash tender offer premia. Private tender offers are exempted from the disclosure regulations, and offer premia are significanty lower in private than in public cash tender offers for voting-control. Furthermore, it is found that offer premia are significantly higher in all-cash than in all-stock offers, whether the bid is for voting-control or a minority buyout. The higher cash-premium, which is not explained by taxes or regulations, is consistent with an information-signalling effect of the means of payment
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