Interest group politics and the licensing of public accountants
Author: Young, S. David INSEAD Area: Accounting and ControlIn: Accounting Review, vol. 66, no. 4, October 1991 Language: EnglishDescription: p. 809-817.Type of document: INSEAD ArticleNote: Please ask us for this itemAbstract: Public accounting leaders in the United States argue that the government must regulate the profession to protect the public from unqualified practitioners. To this end, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and its affiliate state societies propose restrictive accountancy laws that limit both the right to express opinions on financial statements and the use of certain occupational titles to licensed public accountants. Whereas some states have adopted relatively permissive licensing laws, others restrict all analytical work and professional titles to licensees. This study presents a model designed to explain why some states have adopted more restrictive licensing regimes than others. The evidence shows that restrictive licensing regimes are more likely in states where the interest-group strenght of CPAs is high, as measured by their numbers relative to public accountants who are not CPAs| Item type | Current location | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds |
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Public accounting leaders in the United States argue that the government must regulate the profession to protect the public from unqualified practitioners. To this end, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and its affiliate state societies propose restrictive accountancy laws that limit both the right to express opinions on financial statements and the use of certain occupational titles to licensed public accountants. Whereas some states have adopted relatively permissive licensing laws, others restrict all analytical work and professional titles to licensees. This study presents a model designed to explain why some states have adopted more restrictive licensing regimes than others. The evidence shows that restrictive licensing regimes are more likely in states where the interest-group strenght of CPAs is high, as measured by their numbers relative to public accountants who are not CPAs
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