Product-mix information markets
Author: Soberman, David A. ; Iyer, GaneshINSEAD Area: Marketing Series: Working Paper ; 98/82/MKT Publisher: Fontainebleau : INSEAD, 1998.Language: EnglishDescription: 44 p.Type of document: INSEAD Working Paper Online Access: Click here Abstract: The paper examines two aspects of the markets for product-mix information: a) the manner in which retention and conquesting modifications affect competition between downstream firms and b) the optimal selling and pricing policies for a vendor who markets information that is useful for product modifications. Two important aspects of the vendor's contracting problem are considered. First, how should a vendor package and target the information to downstream firms? In particular, the authors examine whether a vendor has an incentive to limit the type of information sold to these firms. Second, can a vendor gain by offering "exclusivity" to a firm buying the information?| Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds |
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Digital Library | Available | BC001798 |
The paper examines two aspects of the markets for product-mix information: a) the manner in which retention and conquesting modifications affect competition between downstream firms and b) the optimal selling and pricing policies for a vendor who markets information that is useful for product modifications. Two important aspects of the vendor's contracting problem are considered. First, how should a vendor package and target the information to downstream firms? In particular, the authors examine whether a vendor has an incentive to limit the type of information sold to these firms. Second, can a vendor gain by offering "exclusivity" to a firm buying the information?
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