Information acquisition by firms: the role of specialization, motivation and ability (RV of 97/106/MKT)
Author: Christen, Markus INSEAD Area: Marketing Series: Working Paper ; 98/77/MKT (revised version of 97/106/MKT) Publisher: Fontainebleau : INSEAD, 1998.Language: EnglishDescription: 39 p.Type of document: INSEAD Working Paper Online Access: Click here Abstract: This paper develops a parsimonious game-theoretic model to examine these two tradeoffs in the acquisition of information. It consists of two Cournot competitors that face uncertainty about demand and cost conditions. The authors determine the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the two-stage game and then analyze the effects of uncertainty, degree of competition, availability of data and a firm's ability to process data on the acquisition of information. Previous title: Optimal information acquisition for firm decisions - Christen, Markus - 1997 - INSEAD Working Paper| Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds |
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Digital Library | Available | BC001795 |
This paper develops a parsimonious game-theoretic model to examine these two tradeoffs in the acquisition of information. It consists of two Cournot competitors that face uncertainty about demand and cost conditions. The authors determine the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the two-stage game and then analyze the effects of uncertainty, degree of competition, availability of data and a firm's ability to process data on the acquisition of information.
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